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ABSTRACT 
Theodor W. Adorno makes the following claim in his 1962 essay “Progress”: “The 
possibility of progress, of averting the most extreme, total disaster, has migrated to 
this global subject alone. Everything else involving progress must crystalize 
around it.”1 While this is Adorno’s most explicit articulation of the importance of a 
global subject, it is not the only one. In multiple places across his work he makes 
reference to mankind’s current lack of a global subject, and the need for a global 
subject to develop and intervene. This paper weaves together the first systematic 
analysis of a “global subject [Gesamtsubjekt]” as Adorno uses it throughout his 
philosophical work. It explores this concept and takes as its guide three inter-
related questions. First, how does Adorno use the concept of the global subject in 
his work? Second, what antecedent philosophical ideas are influencing Adorno’s 
understanding of what a global subject actually is? And third, how does 
understanding Adorno’s utilization of this concept change how we think about his 
ideas about revolutionary activity in our “administered world”.2  
 
 
1 Theodor W. Adorno, “Progress,” in Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords, trans. Henry 
W. Pickford (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 144.  
2 In “Towards a New Manifesto” Adorno explicitly stated the importance of revolution. (TNM 57). 
But for Adorno scholars and Adornians more generally, it is difficult to understand this position 
alongside the criticisms primarily from the German student movement in his later years for being 
“critical in theory, conformist in practice”. This line is quoted in Leslie, “Introduction to 
Adorno/Marcuse Correspondence”, p.119. The concept of the global subject can contribute to 
resolving this quagmire.  
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Introduction 
 
You say that nothing in life is black or white. 
But that is a lie. A very dangerous lie. 
Either we prevent a 1.5 degree of warming, or we don’t. 
Either we avoid setting off that irreversible chain reaction beyond human control, or we 
don’t. 
Either we choose to go on as a civilisation or we don’t. 
That is as black or white as it gets. 
Because there are no grey areas when it comes to survival. 
 
-Greta Thunberg, The 19753 
 
Theodor W. Adorno makes the following claim in his 1962 essay “Progress”: “The 
possibility of progress, of averting the most extreme, total disaster, has migrated to this 
global subject alone. Everything else involving progress must crystalize around it.”4 While 
this is Adorno’s most explicit articulation of the importance of a global subject, it is not 
the only one. In multiple places across his work he makes reference to mankind’s current 
lack of a global subject, and the need for a global subject to develop and intervene. This 
paper weaves together the first systematic analysis of a “global subject [Gesamtsubjekt]” 
as Adorno uses it throughout his philosophical work. It explores this concept and takes as 
its guide three inter-related questions. First, how does Adorno use the concept of the global 
subject in his work? Second, what antecedent philosophical ideas are influencing Adorno’s 
understanding of what a global subject actually is? And third, how does understanding 
Adorno’s utilization of this concept change how we think about his ideas about 
revolutionary activity in our “administered world”.5  
 
3 Greta Thunberg, “The 1975”. Song released by The 1975.  
4 Theodor W. Adorno, “Progress,” in Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords, trans. Henry W. 
Pickford (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 144.  
5 In “Towards a New Manifesto” Adorno explicitly stated the importance of revolution. (TNM 57). But for 
Adorno scholars and Adornians more generally, it is difficult to understand this position alongside the 
criticisms primarily from the German student movement in his later years for being “critical in theory, 
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This paper will argue that Adorno’s insistence on the radical change of humanity 
in its entirety is elucidated by the concept of a “global subject” and this concept therefore 
needs to be understood as central in his work. Many commentators have failed to mention 
this concept or to provide any real sustained reflection on it, how Adorno uses it, and what 
he may mean by it. This paper maintains that the concept is important because firstly, it is 
a conceptual tool that highlights Adorno’s acute understanding of the totalizing and 
catastrophic problems the human species now faces in the midst of late-stage capitalism. 
Secondly, it illuminates Adorno’s ideas about what type of revolutionary subject is needed 
to address these issues through a recurring critique of totality. What is more, this concept 
of the global subject is indispensable for thinking through and addressing the problems the 
human family faces today. Establishing a global subject is a categorical imperative for 
humankind if we desire the survival of our species and we must face this harsh reality while 
thinking from within the Anthropocene. 
The paper will be divided into two main sections. The first section will explore how 
Adorno utilizes the concept of a global subject throughout his writing. The concept is 
employed by Adorno in his History and Freedom lectures, his essay “Progress”, Negative 
Dialectics, as well as “Late Capitalism or Industrial Society?”, and even his posthumously 
published Aesthetic Theory, among other works. Since understanding Adorno’s concept 
necessitates looking across multiple works, it will be necessary to point towards and 
contextualize the places where Adorno employs this term in his texts. The purpose of this 
 
conformist in practice”. This line is quoted in Leslie, “Introduction to Adorno/Marcuse Correspondence”, 
p.119. The concept of the global subject can contribute to resolving this quagmire.  
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first section is to construct a philosophical through-line of interpretation of what connects 
this concept in Adorno’s thought.  
The second section of the paper holds up this interpretation of the global subject 
next to antecedent philosophical ideas going back to Kant, to illuminate more closely 
Adorno’s own ideas. Since the global subject represents a new way of understanding what 
a revolutionary subject would have to look like, Adorno’s critical engagement with the 
topic of revolutionary activity will also be addressed. 6  This task is undertaken by 
constructing the nexus of philosophical antecedents to the concept with which Adorno is 
engaging. It is important to colour the concept of the global subject with the intellectual 
tradition that Adorno is responding to, and critically appropriating, in order to more fully 
understand the phenomenon Adorno is attempting to point towards with this concept. 
Among the multitude of influences on Adorno, there are three main influences that will be 
addressed here. The three influences are Immanuel Kant’s ideas about “humanity 
[Menschheit]”, the Hegelian-Marxist idea of “species-being [Gattungswesen]”, and Marx’s 
understanding of the proletariat.  
The paper will then conclude with my reflections on why the concept of a global 
subject is important not only for understanding Adorno, but for understanding how 
humankind today, in the midst of the Anthropocene, must wake up from its sleep-walk into 
extinction. This will be followed by some brief remarks on impediments to the global 
 
6 I intentionally word this quite carefully. I do not want to claim that Adorno had complete ideas about 
what a future truly human society would look like. I do not want to claim either that Adorno had ideas 
about what a successful revolutionary subject would look like. It is indeed clear that Adorno denied that we 
had unrestrained epistemological access to something outside the bounds of our embeddedness in the bad 
life. Therefore, in approaching utopia one could only do it negatively. Adorno is indeed pessimistic, but he 
does leave room for thoughts ability to open up, resemble play, and break through the mere existent. When 
thought can locate the determinate negation of the sources of harm to individual people’s lives, then 
thought’s possibilities will open up and have the potential to catch glimpses of a better way.  
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subject and the importance of education in bringing the revolutionary global subject 
forward. 
Adorno, in his writings observed and often commented on our human society’s 
progress towards total catastrophe. The looming catastrophe that Adorno talks about is 
sometimes undefined and could take on many different forms. Certainly, the threat of 
nuclear war, the rise of fascist and tyrannical societies, and the destruction of the natural 
world are top candidates. However, a mainstay of Adorno’s thought is his understanding 
and assessment of the instrumental domination of nature our societies are built on as a 
grave threat to the survival of our species. Adorno says that society’s “principle of 
particular private interest” might well lead to “the death of all.”7 The metabolism between 
humanity’s forces of production and its impact on the global ecosystem is the gravest threat 
to the survival of our species.8 
 As Deborah Cook points out in the opening lines to her book, Adorno on Nature, 
“Decades before the environmental movement emerged in the 1960’s, Theodor W. Adorno 
criticized our destructive and self-destructive relation to nature.”9 Adorno’s assessment of 
the impending catastrophe that the human species faces, and that the whole biosphere faces 
as well, is as germane today as ever. In one of many examples where Adorno is entertaining 
 
7 Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. E.B Ashton. (New York: Continuum Publishing 
Company, 1973), 298. 
8 I am using the dichotomy to get across the point that our system of production is indeed destroying the 
natural resources the earth provides us with. But early on, in “The Idea of Natural History”, and reaffirmed 
in Negative Dialectics, Adorno made clear that nature and society are not separate beings. The natural is 
always historical, and the historical is always natural. Adorno says that human history is natural history and 
natural history is also human history. And therefore, it is inadequate to think of nature on one side and 
historical modes of production on the other. Today it may be easier to understand this than ever before. Our 
global societal constitution is causing natural disasters unparalleled in human history. The earth and 
humankind are one, a single self-organizing biosphere, they participate in an “affinity” Adorno would come 
to say.  
9 Deborah Cook, Adorno on Nature, (Durham: Acumen, 2011), 1.  
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the thought of our society destroying itself, he says in Negative Dialectics, “There is a 
universal feeling, a universal fear, that our progress in controlling nature may increasingly 
help to weave the very calamity it is supposed to protect us from.”10 Obviously this “very 
calamity it [controlling nature] is supposed to protect us from” is the destruction or 
extinction of our species. For Adorno, the instinct to dominate nature is an outgrowth of 
survival instincts. But today, the domination that was intended for the survival of the 
species has undermined itself and now presents a very real threat to us all.  
Despite Adorno’s persistent pessimism, he displayed moments of open thought 
where he explored positive concepts that may assist in overcoming the calamities we face 
as well.  These concepts include reconciliation, solidarity, critical self-reflection, non-
identity, etc., and of course the global subject. The global subject sits in a dialectical nexus 
with many of these emphatic concepts. I will not be able to investigate all of them together 
here, but the concept is certainly not a stand-alone one, and shows Adorno’s grappling with 
ideas beyond mere negative critique. After all, Adorno thinks the central question of moral 
philosophy, which he further claims is the central question of philosophy in general is, 
“What shall we do?”11 Since Adorno himself claims this is the quintessential philosophical 
question, commentators on Adorno should explore the positive dimensions of his thought- 
which are admittedly few- about what we shall do, if we intend to understand Adorno on 
his own terms.    
The concept of the global subject can be extremely useful for our contemporary 
world. People are already demanding action all over the world to avoid a climate 
 
10 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 67. 
11 Adorno, Theodor W. Problems of Moral Philosophy, ed. Thomas Schröder, and trans. Rodney Livingstone, 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), 3.  
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catastrophe.12 It is morally deplorable, and gut-wrenching how much damage our species 
has inflicted to our home-planet, to our bio-sphere, which is the lifeblood of our very 
existence. No species but our own would be so clearly acting against its interest in its 
collective survival. We are headed towards the destruction of our societies, monuments, 
culture, and species, if we do not change our ways. As Greta Thunberg said in the quote at 
the opening of this paper, there are no grey areas when it comes to survival.  But how do 
we understand and change our actions in the face of such a chronic and universal impending 
disaster? Most importantly, how do individuals themselves relate to such a universal 
problem for collective action to take place? How do parents, teachers, welders, lifeguards, 
etc., relate to such a problem when they must drive to work in carbon emitting vehicles 
because urban planning renders it the easiest way, particularly in the West? How do people 
today, who were forced to “surrender” the task of self-preservation to the capitalist 
economy, now attempt to fight the consequences of this very capitalist economy that they 
depend on? How can individuals relate to the spectre of climate collapse when they have 
to think of their individual survival? It is my claim that Adorno’s concept of the global 
subject opens up possibilities for thought and action in the face of crisis and represents a 
new categorical imperative for mankind that is unrelenting in its aim to change humankind 
in its entirety to avoid utter catastrophe.  
Section 1: The Concept of the Global Subject and Progress 
It will be necessary to provide some preliminary remarks on Adorno’s account of 
progress before we can understand the concept of the global subject in its entirety, the two 
concepts are inseparable. Adorno refers most often to the global subject in his essay 
 
12 School Strikes for Climate, Extinction Rebellion, YouthStrikeForClimate and many more.  
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“Progress” and his History and Freedom lectures, where he makes very clear statements 
on the importance of the global subject, claiming for example that any talk of progress 
must crystalize around the concept of the global subject alone.13  
Adorno has a more complex engagement with the concept of “progress” than is 
appreciated in the secondary literature. Commentary on Adorno’s philosophical work 
continues to be dominated by a thoroughly pessimistic and negativist understanding of his 
thought. While Adorno’s assessment of modern forms of damaged life under late-stage 
monopoly capitalism is certainly pessimistic, you would miss something essential in his 
writing if you were to limit your analysis to this. Adorno’s account of progress should not 
be characterized entirely by his pessimistic comments about the irrationality of attributing 
progress as an actuality to history, comments that are exemplified in such lines as the 
catastrophe of Auschwitz “makes all talk of progress towards freedom seem ludicrous.”14 
Adorno investigates the concept of progress philosophically, and therefore dialectically, 
oscillating between thoroughly negative assessments of progress that come close to a bleak 
picture of an angel of history looking back at pure carnage, and open thought about how 
the human species can hold onto such a concept.15   
 
13 Adorno, “Progress,” 144.  
14 Theodor W. Adorno, History and Freedom: Lectures 1964-1965, ed. Rolf Tiedemann and trans. Rodney 
Livingstone. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), 7. 
15 I am drawing on accounts of Adorno’s methodology that emphasize the positive dimension of Adorno’s 
thought, such as Cook in “Open-thinking: Adorno’s Exact Imagination” where thought in Adorno is always 
in some way negating what is and leaping forward into the possible. Cook says that, “determinate negation 
is the positive side of the negation of negation because it may give rise to emphatic concepts that provide 
indirect glimpses of a better world than this one. Of course, what is other than damaged life, nonidentical 
with it, remains distinct from it: what ought to be does not yet exist, and what exists is not yet what it 
should and could be.” (pg. 14). I think this reference to “glimpses of a better world” contains the moment in 
Adorno, where his exploration of the possible in the notion of a global subject leaps beyond what is, or so I 
will attempt to argue here.  
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Before getting to Adorno’s most philosophical assessment of the concept of 
progress, in his essay by that name, it should be noted that Adorno wrote Dialectic of 
Enlightenment- a book that he co-authored eighteen years earlier with friend and colleague 
Max Horkheimer in 1944. In Dialectic of Enlightenment Horkheimer and Adorno express 
an overriding pessimism about the prospects for historical progress. In Dialectic of 
Enlightenment a thorough critique of modernity is on display in assessing enlightenment’s 
“regressive moment” into barbarism. 16  While Adorno and Horkheimer did think that 
“Enlightenment itself, having mastered itself and assumed its own power, could break 
through the limits of enlightenment”,17 they clearly were very hesitant to give substance to 
what things might look like. These early insights would colour Adorno’s thoughts through 
History and Freedom and Negative Dialectics.  
 This pessimism certainly stayed with Adorno. In addition to Adorno’s pessimistic 
assessment of enlightenment rationality and technical progress, exemplified in his mention 
of “progress” from the “slingshot to the megaton bomb”, Adorno believes that individuals 
are subjected to radical forms of coercion, domination, and unfreedom in all aspects of 
their lives. The “way of the world” for Adorno, i.e., what is characteristic of the “totally 
administered society”, is the pervasiveness of exchange relations, and as a consequence of 
exchange: identity-thinking. This domination and administration has been on display in 
humanity’s “progress” from bourgeois “freedom” to the gas chambers of World War II.  
By 1962, post-war Germany was trying to put itself back together, and Adorno 
became a more dominant public intellectual when he returned to Germany. In “Progress” 
 
16 Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments, ed. 
Gunzelin Schmid Noerr, trans. Edmund Jephcott. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), xvi 
17 Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 172.  
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Adorno explicitly engaged in a much more thoroughly dialectical analysis of both the 
positive and negative sides of this concept, and therefore reflected on whether it is still an 
important concept to retain for humankind. The progress essay reconsiders the idea of 
progress historically, and Adorno makes some reflections on its potential meaning in the 
early 1960’s while Germany was still trying to recover from the atrocities of World War 
II. These reflections on the concept of progress are then expanded on and given some 
nuance in the History and Freedom lectures.  
Adorno says at the beginning of “Progress” that a simple yes or no answer cannot 
be given to the question of historical progress. Nor does he think one can really define the 
concept of progress all that precisely. As he says, “Whoever wants to define the concept 
precisely easily destroys what he is aiming at.”18 However, Adorno does not stop here but 
actually reconsiders and dialectically examines the idea of progress and comes to the 
conclusion that it is still meaningful. The principle of progress is still meaningful because 
even though progress as it is currently understood led to historical setbacks, a more 
emphatic notion of progress provides the condition needed for humankind to find the means 
to avert them in the future.19 Adorno encourages us to think of the sinking of the Titanic. 
“The iceberg supposedly dealt the first blow to the idea of progress”,20 but, when one 
reflects, the disaster that the iceberg represented actually brought improved shipping 
regulations and innovations over the next century.  
Commentators have been drawn primarily towards Adorno’s thought-provoking 
dictum that “Progress occurs where it ends.”21 This statement points to the fact that the 
 
18 Adorno, “Progress,” 143. 
19 Ibid., 154. (See also Cook, Adorno on Nature, 109). 
20 Ibid., 154. 
21 Ibid., 150.  
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concept of progress today is immanently tied to the domination of internal and external 
nature, a relic of instinctual behaviour linked to self-preservation. Where this domination 
ends, progress begins. Adorno points to this just before he comes to the aforementioned 
conclusion. He says, “Progress means: to step out of the magic spell, even out of the spell 
of progress that is itself nature, in that humanity becomes aware of its own inbred nature 
and brings to a halt the domination it exacts upon nature and through which domination by 
nature continues.”22  
In addition to these observations about the history of domination, Adorno provides 
some general remarks supporting the idea of progress. For example, he supports the idea 
of progress when he asserts that,  
If society had not passed from a hunting and gathering horde to agriculture, from 
slavery to the formal freedom of subjects, from the fear of demons to reason, from 
deprivation to provisions against epidemics and famine and to the overall 
improvement of living conditions, if one thus sought more philosophico to keep the 
idea of progress pure, say, to spin it out of the essence of time, then it would not 
have any content at all.23 
Not everything that has happened in history is completely deplorable. For example, Adorno 
remarks in History and Freedom, again on the topic of formal freedoms, that one does not 
know how important formal freedoms are until they are taken away (as Adorno experienced 
himself at the hands of the Gestapo.)24 Even if individuals only enjoy formal freedoms, we 
can see how progressive these freedoms are when they are taken away.  
 
Amy Allen for example notes that this line was the inspiration for the title of her book. Amy Allen, The 
End of Progress: Decolonizing the Normative Foundations of Critical Theory, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2016), 5.  
22 Adorno, “Progress,” 150. 
23 Ibid., 148.  
24 Adorno, History and Freedom, 140.  
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So, with these points being made, it is clear that Adorno is ambivalent about 
progress. Furthermore, he certainly does think that there is no overriding theodicy, or 
necessity to progress in history as some philosophers have posited. Echoing this point, 
Amy Allen in her recent work, is correct when she notes that Adorno’s methodology 
“reconstructs history as a story of both progress and regress at the same time.”25 Yet it is 
certainly suspect that Allen notes this, but fails to analyze the positive dimensions of 
Adorno’s assessment, particularly the concept of the global subject. So what does reflection 
on the concept of progress yield to us today when facing utter catastrophe? It is from here 
we can begin to unpack Adorno’s thoughts about what progress would mean today. Adorno 
is very clear that “[p]rogress means whether humanity is capable of preventing 
catastrophe.”26 What is more, “[p]rogress would be the very establishment of humanity in 
the first place, whose prospect opens up in face of its extinction.”27  
So, Adorno maintains that progress would mean the very establishment of humanity 
in the first place, and the prevention of catastrophe. Progress would mean a conscious 
understanding and awareness of humanity’s own “inbred nature” and therefore bring us 
closer to reconciling with nature as a whole and our own nature. The possibility of progress 
in all these formulations has migrated to this global subject alone.  
Now that some preliminary remarks on Adorno’s reflections on the concept of 
progress have been presented, we can ask what progress would be in the face of humanity’s 
extinction, what is the global subject, and how does it fit into “[t]wo centuries of brutal 
history in which the moment to realize philosophy, the hope of the left Hegelians like Marx, 
 
25 Allen, The End of Progress, 166.  
26 Adorno, “Progress,” 144.  
27 Ibid., 145.  
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was missed.”28 The following section will undertake a deep textual analysis of the concept 
of the “global subject” as it appears in Adorno’s work, while engaging in a critical analysis 
of what can be extracted from Adorno’s comments about it. 
 A primary focus of this section will be the focus on the dialectic of individual and 
society. As we will see, Adorno’s criticism of previous ideas about humanity always target 
the conceptual attempt to “swallow up” or engulf the individual into the totality, and 
therefore the complexity, the nuance, and the non-identity of the individual and the species 
are overlooked. Consequently, contained in the concept of the global subject is Adorno’s 
own gesturing towards the possibility of a different relation between the individual and the 
species. It represents a real unity instead of a forced totality. This new relation would be 
one with a non-dominating relation between the individual and the society that individual 
lives in. This section will also have to make the case for the importance of an emerging 
global subject today. 
Textual Analysis of The Global Subject 
Adorno employs the concept of a “self-conscious global subject [ein seiner selbst 
bewußtes Gesamtsubjekt]” near the beginning of his progress essay, and he refers to 
humanity’s own “global subject” becoming sufficiently self-aware in the History and 
Freedom lectures.29 This could be easily misunderstood if one does not consider what 
Adorno means when he uses this concept. He does not articulate in much detail explicitly 
what this concept entails, but by drawing from comments in his discussion of progress, and 
comments scattered throughout his texts one can reconstruct some of Adorno’s intentions 
 
28 J.M Bernstein, “Negative Dialectic as Fate: Adorno and Hegel,” in The Cambridge Companion to 
Adorno, ed. Tom Huhn, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 20.  
29 Adorno, History and Freedom, 143.  
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with this concept. In addition to the History and Freedom lectures and his essay “Progress”, 
Adorno uses the concept “Gesamtsubjekt” in Negative Dialectics, “Late Capitalism or 
Industrial Society?”, his “Introduction” to The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, his 
posthumously published Aesthetic Theory, and perhaps most interestingly in “Aldous 
Huxley and Utopia”.  
One of the difficulties in locating this concept in Adorno’s work for English readers 
is the different translations of the concept. Henry Pickford (in his translation of “Progress”), 
and Rodney Livingstone (in his translation of the History and Freedom lectures) both 
translate Gesamtsubjekt as “global subject”. Alternatively, E.B Ashton translates 
Gesamtsubjekt in Negative Dialectics as “total subject”. What is more, in “Late Capitalism 
or Industrial society”, Livingstone, who translated it as “global subject” in History and 
Freedom, in this text translates the concept as “overall social subject”.30  
Adorno’s repeated lambasting of the “totality” i.e., capitalist society, may make the 
translation of Gesamtsubjekt as “total subject” problematic. As we will continue to see, this 
emphatic concept contains the culmination of Adorno’s critique of totality. Global subject 
on the other hand certainly contains the connotation of something beyond the principle of 
particular interest that is so deeply embedded in capitalism. So, what does this concept 
mean and how should it be translated? In Barron’s German to English Dictionary “gesamt” 
is translated as “whole, entire, or total”.31 The question comes down to what Adorno means 
by “gesamt” in placing it before “subjekt”. Following Adorno, however, I will hold off on 
 
30 Theodor W. Adorno, “Late Capitalism or Industrial Society?” in Can One Live After Auschwitz ed. Rolf 
Tiedmann, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 124.  
31 Barron’s Foreign Language Guides, German to English Pocket Dictionary, (Hauppauge: Barron’s 
Educational Series, 2008), 144.  
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firm definitions for the time being in order to construct a constellation around the 
phenomenon in an attempt to shed light on it.32 
First I will reconstruct Adorno’s use of the concept of the global subject in 
“Progress” and History and Freedom, then I will continue on to the other works in which 
Adorno uses the concept in, and I will end with his use of the concept in “Aldous Huxley 
and Utopia,” because his use of the concept in that essay takes on a different focus in 
comparison to the other places he uses the concept. This essay reveals a more substantive 
account of determinate negation in his critique of utopia and totality, pointing towards other 
content he associates with the global subject.  
Someone could object at this point, that the concept is just not as important as this 
paper assumes to be the case or that it does not matter because Adorno only mentions it a 
few times and never explores it explicitly. But it would be a short-lived criticism because 
Adorno clearly and explicitly says that “[t]he possibility of progress, of averting the most 
extreme, total disaster, has migrated to this global subject alone. Everything else involving 
progress must crystalize around it.”33 Those are powerful words coming from a philosopher 
who is often taken to have nothing to say about the future or the potential of what is beyond 
the actual. And some commentators have appreciated the importance of this concept. For 
example, Cook in Adorno, Foucault, and the Critique of the West, astutely points towards 
the global subject as Adorno’s championing of sweeping and radical change.34 She goes 
on to say that, “In the face of an increasingly totalitarian expansion of capital, only a global 
 
32 Adorno’s critique of thinking that places questions of meaning over substance is revealed in History and 
Freedom when he says, “A self-righteous defense of tidy thinking responds by offering us stones instead of 
bread” (HF 189).  “Definitions…should follow from philosophical reflection, rather than preceding it with 
a view to keeping it under control.” (HF 190).  
33 Adorno, “Progress,” 144. 
34 Deborah Cook, Adorno, Foucault, Critique of the West, (London: Verso, 2018), 101.  
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subject can counter the existential threats that the ruthless pursuit of profit under late 
capitalism now poses.35  
Adorno introduces this notion when he gives some substance to what progress 
would look like.  In his lectures on History and Freedom he says that, 
I believe that you should start by taking progress to mean this very simple thing: 
that it would be better if people had no cause to fear, if there were no impending 
catastrophe on the horizon, if you do this, it will not provide a timeless, absolute 
definition of progress, but it will give the idea a concrete form. For progress today 
really does mean simply the prevention and avoidance of total catastrophe.”36  
But it is important to note that Adorno’s discussion of progress does not stop here. He says 
further that “all these reflections come to a head in the question of whether mankind will 
succeed in preventing catastrophe.”37 Thus, Adorno moves from an analysis of the concept 
of progress and what it may mean, to the question of the possibility of progress.  
Can human beings in fact prevent catastrophe such as the climate crisis we face 
today? It is in approaching this question that Adorno arrives at the notion of a global 
subject. He continues:   
Humanity’s survival is threatened by the forms of its own global social constitution, 
unless humanity’s own global subject becomes sufficiently self-aware to come to 
its rescue after all. The possibility of progress, of averting the most extreme total 
calamity, has migrated to this global subject alone.38  
It is certainly clear that Adorno is making the idea of the emergence of a global subject an 
immanent demand on the human species if the species wants any sort of progress to occur 
and if we want to see the continuation of the human species. This seems to be based on the 
fact that now, humanity’s life is threatened on a global scale. What is more, it would not 
 
35 Ibid. 
36 Adorno, History and Freedom, 143. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid.  
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be too much of a reach to claim that this statement imposes a new categorical imperative 
on mankind, particularly in the 21st century. Humankind must have a global subject emerge 
for our species’ survival because the problems we face today require collective and species-
wide solutions. This point seems as justified today as the moment it was penned. 
The global subject is equal to the establishment of humanity itself for Adorno.39 
The fact that humanity’s life is threatened, may in fact prove useful for human beings to 
finally wake up and start changing things especially- including themselves. Adorno makes 
this point as well when he says, “progress would be the very establishment of humanity in 
the first place, whose prospect opens up in the face of its extinction.”40 Adorno claims that 
prospects open up in the face of extinction elsewhere as well. He clearly thinks that, or it 
may be better to say, he hopes that, in the face of a totalizing barrier, a block to thinking in 
the sense of an obstacle to our collective survival, we can think beyond what is the case. 
Thought can reach into possibilities and conceive a new way forward because we will have 
no choice. We are in such a dire situation that we have to start thinking about how we can 
get out of the mess we made–the threat of catastrophe is a powerful impetus to thought. If 
we do not want the species to die, we have to think about how to free ourselves from this 
threat.  
Explaining this point, Adorno gives the historical example of the Titanic.41 He says 
that one might think that an iceberg “dealt the first blow to our faith in progress”, but this 
misses the fact that this calamity lead to unprecedented improvements in shipping over the 
next century. Historical setbacks as the product of the progressive principle, are essential 
 
39 A more thorough investigation into what exactly humanity as a product means for Adorno is found in 
Part Two.  
40 Adorno, History and Freedom, 145. 
41 Adorno, “Progress,” 154. See also History and Freedom, 160.  
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to the dialectic of progress for Adorno. When the human mind is presented with a barrier, 
a calamity, a catastrophic state of affairs, it can open thought up to new possibilities. 
Analogously, Adorno thinks that it may be possible that, in the face of its extinction, 
humanity will finally be awakened. But awakening humanity from the spell of what merely 
is, to see what is possible, will not be easy because revolutionary activity has just as much 
to do with social solidarity and collective action, as it does with the necessary conceptual 
revolution, that is, understanding ourselves and who we are differently, which may be the 
more difficult task. But this will be explored later.  
At this point it may be fruitful to mention a metaphor Adorno uses in his History 
and Freedom lectures. Adorno has a particularly illuminating image that sheds light on 
what he means by the global subject, or an established humanity.  
If the image of an advancing humanity reminds us of a giant who, after sleeping 
from time immemorial, slowly bestirs himself and then storms forth, trampling 
down everything that gets in his way, his rude awakening is the only potential for 
maturity.42 
This image of the giant, if we take it together with the previous passage about the species 
facing calamities and overcoming them, points towards a new way to understand the notion 
of a global subject. The global subject would be a human species actually becoming self-
aware (waking-up) from its own sleep-walking into extinction. The global subject would 
begin to act and think on behalf of the survival of the species and tear down what is 
antithetical to that goal. The global subject has a moral component to it as well. It must 
harmonize universal principles (something like a principle of harmony of the biosphere, or 
Benjamin’s thesis considering the “happiness of unborn generations”), and an emotional, 
 
42 Adorno, History and Freedom, 152. 
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impulsive disgust for our current destructive and unsustainable practices. Bringing these 
together could move the human species towards the first establishment of humanity. 
 Adorno once wrote that Auschwitz provided the human being with a new 
categorical imperative.43 A WWF report, involving fifty-nine scientists from around the 
globe have found that since 1970, 60% of all mammals, reptiles, amphibians, birds and fish 
around the world have been wiped out.44 Since these practices of consumption by the global 
population are destroying life and everything on which humankind depends, there are 
sufficient grounds for the establishment of a new categorical imperative. That is, every 
individual’s survival depends on the survival of the species. We must find a new way of 
organizing collectively so that our species can finally take control of its own direction, and 
therefore its own destiny to stop its destructive path. As George Monbiot puts it in an article 
written for The Guardian, “No one is coming to save us. Mass civil disobedience is 
essential to force a political response.” “Only rebellion will prevent an ecological 
collapse.” 45  Here Monbiot is arguing for collective action; individuals need to work 
collectively to address this problem because no one is coming to save us. 
Adorno also makes some other interesting comments about the global subject that 
help to provide more substance to its goals. Immediately after mentioning the global 
subject, Adorno begins to speak of material needs, and the fact that they have been 
potentially eliminated thanks to the state of the technical means of production. 
Material needs, which long seemed to mock progress, have been potentially 
eliminated; thanks to the present state of the technical forces of production no one 
 
43 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 365.  
44 World Wide Fund (WWF), Living Planet Report – 2018: Aiming Higher, ed. Monique Grooten, 
Rosamunde Almond, Gland, Switzerland, 2018.  
45 George Monbiot, “Only Rebellion Will Prevent an Ecological Apocalypse.” The Guardian. (April 15, 
2019), 8 
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on the planet need suffer deprivation anymore. Whether there will be further want 
and oppression – which are the same thing- will be decided solely on the avoidance 
of catastrophe through the rational establishment of the whole society as 
humanity.46  
Clearly then, the rational establishment of humanity would be one where we finally wake 
up and realize that we can eliminate want and oppression through self-conscious and 
rational establishment of our forces of production, if we only had the will and solidarity for 
resistance to the current order.47 Genuine progress would negate want, oppression, and the 
suffering of individuals who are rooted in their forced surrender of the task of self-
preservation to the capitalist economy. But in addition to this it would need to halt the 
destructive practices that this possibility is based on. Adorno here is reiterating Marx’s 
focus on reorienting material production to establish a truly human society, i.e., one where 
we can explore and develop more completely as individuals and as a species. As he says in 
Negative Dialectics, “Anyone who traces de-formation to metaphysical processes rather 
than to the conditions of material production is a purveyor of ideologies.”48  
This focus on the elimination of want and oppression is directly tied to another 
point that Adorno makes about the global subject: it would be “a human race that possesses 
genuine control over its own destiny right down to the concrete details.”49 This is one of 
the most important points in analyzing the global subject. Individuals should not be forced 
to submit to, or to be dominated by, a production process where they are simply relegated 
 
46 Adorno, “Progress,” 144.  
47 There is indeed a problem with “re-orienting” existing structures to eliminate want and oppression. For 
example, a contributing factor to the objective possibility for humanity feeding the world is built on 
industrial farms and current unsustainable agricultural practices. But this system of producing food, which 
is new to capitalism, is a large contributing factor to the destruction of our environment by eliminating the 
nutrients from the soil, emitting carbon into the atmosphere, and deforestation. We cannot fall into the trap 
of thinking a simple change in distribution will solve this problem; the problem runs much deeper.  
48 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 284.  
49 Ibid. 
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to appendages of the machinery of production. Individuals should have concrete control 
over their ability to provide for their own existence since we live in a society of abundance 
and not one of scarcity. When individuals have control over what they need and require, it 
eliminates their dependence on the wasteful capitalist system. This aspect of the global 
subject will be more clearly articulated in Section Two’s discussion of species-being.  
Actually, establishing individuals goes hand in hand with establishing a truly 
human society. As Adorno says, “Just as individuals have not existed hitherto, so too there 
has been no global subject; the two are corollaries to one another.”50 This is quite important 
to Adorno’s thoughts. One of the primary harms that establishing humanity would negate 
would be the powerlessness individuals feel in relation to a totally administered society 
that they are born into. Adorno is very critical of the preponderance of the exchange-based 
society over individuals. In surrendering to the system of capitalism an individual only is 
allowed a pseudo-individuality, which permits choosing between mere commodities that 
provide the illusion of freedom instead of choosing through self-determination and truly 
exploring all one’s capabilities. Adorno agrees with Horkheimer in “Towards a New 
Manifesto”: “Freedom is not the freedom to accumulate, but the fact that I have no need to 
accumulate.”51 This goes hand in hand with the fact that “a change in the conditions of 
production might relieve the violent picture which the world shows to its violators.”52  
Adorno is thus negating the totalizing and de-individualizing state of the world and 
negating it to understand what a truly human society could be. It would be a society that 
 
50 Adorno, History and Freedom, 118.  
51 Adorno, “Towards a New Manifesto,” trans. Rodney Livingstone. In New Left Review, (September 2010, 
Issue 65, pp. 33-61), 37. 
52 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 284. 
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focuses not on integration, but on a respect for radical differentiation. Adorno conceives of 
society today as a “false totality” that posits a false identity. The identity thinking in an 
exchange-based system like our own moves towards a forced identity. This forced identity 
is reflected in the fungibility of commodities under capitalism which ends by making all 
living things fungible as well. Adorno is therefore interested in focusing on a system that 
appreciates difference instead of valuing integration, only then would we have a “truly 
achieved identity.”53 Further on this point, Adorno says that “A truly achieved identity (for 
the species) would have to be the consciousness of non-identity, or, more accurately 
perhaps, it would have to be the creation of a reconciled non-identity”.54  This has to still 
be worked out. The dialectic of individual and species that is contained here in the concept 
of the global subject is indeed important to understand in Adorno, so much so that he claims 
in Negative Dialectics that “theory should carry out the dialectics of individual and 
species.”55 And in History and Freedom, he calls this a problem of the greatest possible 
gravity.56 
 The decentralization of the existing relations of production is essential here. As 
Adorno says in History and Freedom when critiquing the “fetishization of the concept of 
the nation”: “What I have in mind is something that would change the form of society itself 
and put an end to the abstract organization that acts so repressively towards its members.”57 
Adorno reiterates the point that organizing the relations of production for the benefit of all 
is not utopian because the state of technology opens up the possibility “of decentralization 
 
53 Ibid., 55.  
54 Ibid. 
55 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 283. 
56 Adorno, History and Freedom, 44-45.  
57 Ibid., 111.  
 22 
 
that actually makes it unnecessary to bring societies together into gigantic hierarchical 
entities.”58 
Adorno’s insistence on critiquing and questioning the very structure of modern 
bourgeois forms of life, and his insistence that “[i]n the meantime, however, it would 
already be possible to organize societies far more rationally in much smaller units that 
could collaborate peaceably with one another”59 , points towards his forward-looking 
solutions to how we might face climate change today. Huge monopolistic industrial farms 
and food that is shipped half way around the world contribute to incalculably large amounts 
of carbon emissions. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has said that, cutting 
carbon emissions from transportation and energy is not enough to fight climate change. We 
also need a strategy to completely change the way the world produces food and manages 
land.60 
In the face of this challenge to sustainability, one of the most prominent methods 
that has been recommended for fighting climate change is micro-gridding. “In a future with 
higher temperatures, less water, more frequent and severe wildfires and more extreme 
weather events, microgrids can provide unparalleled reliability and resilience” 61 
Microgrids are a small example of how communities can fight climate change by reducing 
carbon emissions and their impact on the world around them. Microgrids offer resilience 
to extreme weather events, which is obviously an increasingly present problem today. As 
the Center for Climate and Energy Solutions who are an independent, non-profit 
 
58 Ibid.  
59 Ibid. 
60 International Panel on Climate Change, “Climate Change and Land,” See particularly A-4. 
61 Leia Guccione, “The micro(grid) solution to the macro challenge of climate change” October 14, 2013, 
published at GreenBiz.com.  
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organization working to forge practical solutions to climate change says, “Microgrids can 
help deploy more zero-emissions energy sources, make use of waste heat, reduce energy 
lost through transmission lines, help manage power supply and demand, and improve grid 
resilience to extreme weather.”62 Microgrids are one example of a democratization of 
resources, power and self-sufficiency to the people, instead of corporations. The same must 
be done with food production, and every other area of human life if we are to establish a 
sustainable humanity.  
Individuals’ needs are of vital importance for Adorno’s understanding of an 
established humanity. This global subject is meant to aim at “what all men long for.”63 We 
have the objective possibilities to feed, clothe and house the entire human population, but 
we have not yet realized these possibilities because these socially necessary pursuits are 
not rationally organized with the species in mind. Instead they are organized by corporate 
and private interests. This is the case, even though satisfying vital needs is indeed what all 
men long for, and this entails the elimination of want and oppression. But Adorno goes on 
further to say that “humanity must and will continue to be oppressed until the question of 
material needs has been resolved.”64 Because people have more than just their chains to 
lose today in fighting for a better world, this is task number one. This understanding of the 
potential for radical particularity, the reconciliation of individual and species are all 
contained in this notion of a global subject becoming sufficiently self-aware.  
 Part of this is certainly going to be transferring the instinct for self-preservation to 
the species as a whole because the survival of the individual is unthinkable without the 
 
62 Center for Climate Change and Energy Solutions, “Climate Change Solutions: Microgrids”, published at 
https://www.c2es.org/content/microgrids/.  
63 Adorno, History and Freedom, 143.  
64 Ibid., 144.  
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survival of the species. In its current shape, every action one is making towards one’s own 
self-preservation is actually antithetical to the survival of the species. All this sounds well 
and good, but how do we get there? And what actually is the global subject? Is it one large 
international organization? Is it a collective consciousness in something like the internet? 
Is it a subject that has absolute sovereignty, like Hobbes’ Leviathan that speaks on behalf 
of the human species? This is where things get a little more complicated and it necessitates 
a little more construction, putting things together, and interpretation.  
 First of all, the global subject is not an international organization. I would argue 
there is no moment of “representation” in the global subject. This would contradict 
Adorno’s criticisms of large-scale organizations as contributing to the individual’s 
unfreedom. Adorno comments on this point directly after talking about the global subject 
in History and Freedom. He writes  
“I have no need to tell you this global subject of mankind is not simply an all-
embracing terrestrial organization, but a human race that possesses genuine control 
of its own destiny right down to the concrete details, and is thus able to fend off the 
unseeing blows of nature. On the contrary, the mania of organization, be it for an 
enlarged League of Nations or for some other global organization of all mankind, 
might easily fall into the category of things that prevent us from achieving what all 
men long for, instead of promoting that cause.”65  
 
Adorno also speaks to this point when he claims again in History and Freedom that “the 
possibility of progress, the avoidance of total catastrophe, has migrated to such a real, not 
merely formal, global social subject.”66  
Here we see Adorno himself refuting Espen Hammer’s criticism of the global 
subject. Hammer accuses Adorno’s position of inconsistency and thereafter critiques the 
 
65 Ibid., 143.  
66 Ibid., 143-144.  
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concept of a global subject in his book Adorno and the Political.67 His critique is that 
Adorno’s advocacy of a global subject is inconsistent with his critique of large-scale 
unitary collectives, such as the United Nations. But the global subject is not a collective 
organization that acts or makes decisions for its constituent human beings and Adorno 
clearly rejects this understanding in the aforementioned quote. Adorno is focused on 
individuals and radical particularity, and the global subject lies in individuals and 
communities of people, not collectives or representatives. As I have said, the global subject 
is the establishment of humanity, and humanity cannot be understood as a generic universal 
concept but that accommodates radical particularity.68   
The global subject that Adorno is speaking of seems to complement Herbert 
Marcuse’s understanding of the new sensibility.69 It involves a new way of understanding 
ourselves and our relationship to the natural world. This global subject seems to point 
towards a conscious understanding of the naturalness of our species, i.e., that we have 
certain biological and ultimately animal needs for food, water, shelter etc., and we have the 
means of producing these things for everyone on earth. Adorno thinks it is fundamental for 
us to understand our own “inbred nature” i.e., that we are natural biological beings and are 
in no way above nature as many philosophical systems have postulated. We as human 
beings require clean air, clean water, space, resources etc., and if we don’t curb private and 
 
67 Espen Hammer, Adorno and the Political, (London: Routledge, 2006).  
68 “Humanity can be conceived only through an “extreme form of differentiation, individuation, not as a 
comprehensive generic concept.” Adorno, “Progress,” Critical Models, 151. 
69 Herbert Marcuse, Essay on Liberation, (Middlesex: Pelican Books, 1972), Famously the title of Chapter 
Two.  
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corporate interests setting the direction of our forces of production, we will be in very 
serious danger as a species.  
I think Adorno foreshadowed, or had an acute understanding that the problems that 
the human species now faces can only be fought on a global scale. But extremely important 
is the fact that Adorno does not simply mean a global approach to a problem with a united 
organization at the front of the fight. A global subject is something much deeper and more 
individual. It encompasses the nature of our species, which is also means the nature of 
individuals; it points towards our species-being. The global subject is Adorno’s 
understanding of what a society might look like when humankind finally tries to 
consciously determine how to structure society by reconciling each individual’s needs with 
the survival of the species. Adorno says in History and Freedom, “Given the current state 
of technological development, the fact that there are still countless millions who suffer 
hunger and want must be attributed to the forms of social production, the relations of 
production, not to the intrinsic difficulty of meeting people’s needs.”70 
 Adorno mentions the global subject in some other places in his texts as well, some 
of which offer a different focus, and thus illuminate different aspects of what the concept 
is pointing towards. For example, in Negative Dialectics, Adorno mentions the 
Gesamtsubjekt in the section on “Construction of the World Spirit.”71 Here E.B. Ashton 
translates “Gesamtsubjekt” as “total subject”. This line reads “To this day history lacks any 
total subject, however construable. Its substrate is the functional connection of real 
individual subjects”, and Adorno continues by quoting Marx and Engels,  
History does nothing, does not ‘possess vast wealth,’ does not ‘fight battles’! It is 
man, rather, the real, living man who does all that, who does posess and fight; it is 
 
70 Adorno, History and Freedom, 144.  
71 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 304. 
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not ‘history’ that uses man as a means to pursue its ends, as if it were a person apart. 
History is nothing but the activity of man pursuing his ends.72  
This is part of a critique of the “mystified” world-spirit as more important than living 
human beings. Human beings are the subjects of history. Thus, beyond Adorno’s 
reflections on progress, he brought the concept into his magnum opus and bemoaned that 
humanity lacks a global subject. In critiquing and engaging in open thought, we must stop 
abstracting from the real lived individuals and their experience, and therefore not reify the 
species or world spirit.  
 Ashton translates Gesamtsubjekt as “total subject” but his translation is problematic 
for a couple reasons. In his writing Adorno is concerned with the preponderance of the 
capitalist system of production over the individual. He often refers to society as the 
universal and lambasts its oppressive character with respect to the individual. The 
individual cannot be free when it is forced to submit to a system of production by taking 
on a meaningless and alienating job as a means to his or her own survival. The individual 
cannot be free when the society does not care about the individual and merely sees him or 
her as a fungible object in the marketplace. Adorno often refers to our exchange-based 
society as the “totality” that preponderates over the individual in late capitalism. It is a “real 
objectivity asserting itself above and through individual’s heads, and thus antagonistic 
from the outset”73 Thus, translating the Gesamtsubjekt as “total subject” seems to distract 
from the fact that most of Adorno’s work is critiquing claims to totality. Adorno would not 
want humankind reifying the solution to its problems into a perceived totality because it 
retains the seeds of what it should be trying to overcome.  
 
72 Ibid.  
73 Ibid. 
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 To reiterate, “total subject” would be an inadequate translation of this concept 
because Adorno’s entire project is indeed a critique of totality. As Sergio Tischler astutely 
points out in his article, the core critical concept in Adorno, particularly when thinking 
about prospects for critiquing capitalism and activism, is the category of particularity.74 
Retaining the concept of particularity, and basing the critique of capitalism on it, are 
essential. Tischler argues that Adorno retains the concept of particularity as a quintessential 
concept because it contains Adorno’s criticism of Marx and Lukács’ ideas about the 
proletariat. Particularity needs to be understood instead of positing that capitalist totality is 
overcome by another totality, i.e., the proletariat. “Adorno claims that to think of radical 
social change in terms of figures of totality is part of the process of perversion and 
fetishization of the idea of revolutionary change.”75 And this is central to what I have been 
trying to present here as encompassed by the global subject. What is more, Jarvis says that  
“[f]or Adorno a true ‘universal’ could never, by the logic of the concept itself, refer to any 
particular class but only to the end of class, to the possibility of a reconciled society – a 
view from what is referred to at the end of Minima Moralia as ‘the standpoint of 
redemption’”.76 But more will be said on this later, I simply want to get the point across 
that translating Gesamtsubjekt as total subject is contrary to Adorno’s entire philosophical 
outlook.   
 This dialectic of individual and society, particular and totality lies at the heart of 
most of Adorno’s writing and it is the paramount consideration in the global subject. 
 
74 Sergio Tischler, “Adorno: The Conceptual Prison of the Subject, Political Fetishism and Class Struggle,” 
In Negativity & Revolution: Adorno and Political Activism, ed. John Holloway, Fernando Matamoros & 
Sergio Tischler, (London: Pluto Press, 2009), 203. 
75 Ibid, 108.  
76 Simon Jarvis, Adorno a Critical Introduction, (New York: Routledge, 1998), 51. 
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Adorno approaches this aspect of the emphatic concept when he says in “Introduction” to 
The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology that “[s]ociety is objective because, on account 
of its underlying structure, it cannot perceive its own subjectivity because it does not 
possess a total subject and through its organization it thwarts the installation of such a 
subject.”77 Here Adorno is equating an understanding of society’s own subjectivity with a 
global subject. By society’s own subjectivity he means understanding that individuals 
perpetuate the objective system of production. Thus, thinking and acting as if society were 
“objective” i.e., relations between objects must be stopped because it is purely ideological, 
society is a relation between subjects. This is a Marxist point that human beings should 
become the subjects of their own history instead of being objects of historical forces outside 
their control.  He expands on this point earlier on in the same text when he says that “society 
is subjective because it refers back to the human beings who create it, and its organizational 
principles too refer back to subjective consciousness and its most general form of 
abstraction- logic, something essentially subjective.”78 
On this same point of the relation of the individual to the totality, Adorno brings up 
the concept of the global subject in “Aldous Huxley and Utopia.” In this essay Adorno is 
critiquing Aldous Huxley’s famous dystopian depiction of a Brave New World.  One of the 
points that Adorno comes back to again and again in this essay is Huxley’s presentation of 
the eradication of individuality in Brave New World. The individual is subsumed into the 
collectivity of society and its individuality is liquidated by the nature of social conditioning 
and right down to the editing of biology. This criticism is certainly based on tendencies 
 
77 Theodor W. Adorno, “Introduction,” in The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, (London: 
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78 Adorno, “Introduction,” 33.  
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that Adorno saw in the totally administered society he was observing, particularly in Nazi 
Germany and the USA. In fact, Adorno was concerned that “Through total social 
mediation, from the outside, as it were, a new immediacy, a new humanity would arise. 
American civilization shows no lack of tendencies in this direction.”79  
Further along these lines of the fungibility of everyone in this kind of dystopian 
future, Adorno says that Brave New World’s  
highest moral principle, supposedly, is that everyone belongs to everyone, an 
absolute interchangeability that extinguishes man as an individual being, liquidates 
as mythology his claim to exist for his own sake, and defines him as existing merely 
for the sake of others and thus, in Huxley’s mind, as worthless.80  
Now, I am not going to comment on Adorno’s analysis of Huxley, since whether 
Adorno misinterpreted Huxley as championing the eradication of individuality is not a 
matter of importance here. What is important for our purposes is what this analysis reveals 
about Adorno’s understanding of totality and the global subject. This commentary on 
Huxley ends with Adorno concluding the essay by saying, “Man’s choice is not between 
individualism and a totalitarian world-state. If the great historical perspective is to be 
anything more than the Fata Morgana of the eye which surveys only to control, it must 
open on to the question of whether society will come to determine itself or bring about 
terrestrial catastrophe.”81 
Adorno also says towards the end of this essay that “[i]nstead of antagonisms, 
Huxley envisages something like an intrinsically non-self-contradictory total subject of 
technological reason, and correspondingly, a simplistic total development.”82 Thus, against 
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Huxley, Adorno is critical of a global subject that would swallow up the individual because 
internal antagonisms, and an appreciation for the real individuality of human beings are 
essential to the global subject. This continues Adorno’s critique of totality and his critique 
of the Hegelian world spirit as we will see in Part Two.  
Adorno’s remarks reveal his fear that there is a tendency for a concept such as a 
global subject to be used to justify a repressive totality, and we should be on alert to combat 
those attempts. We should be on alert to combat these attempts because as Adorno criticizes 
in multiple works, this kind of thinking is what leads to fascism and the suffering of 
individuals. When a reified totality is asserted above and through individual’s heads, the 
focus on the radical particularity of individuals is lost, and individuals become as fungible 
as commodities. Adorno thought this focus on totality and the exchange principle led in a 
straight line to the fungibility of people in the gas chambers of World War II.  
 Adorno’s comments on the global subject in other places focus on articulating the 
absence of such a subject in his critical analysis of the present state of society. For example, 
in “Late Capitalism or Industrial Society?” Adorno again says explicitly “No overall social 
subject exists”83 This comment is embedded in his assessment of Marx’s understanding of 
capitalism and whether this understanding still holds for the present day; what we can hold 
onto in Marx’s analysis and what needs to be updated? The details of this analysis will be 
taken up in Part Two of the paper, but for the purposes of this section it is enough to point 
towards the fact that Adorno brings up the point again that humanity does not have a global 
subject and therefore cannot adequately address the grave issues it faces.  
 
83 Theodor W. Adorno, “Late Capitalism or Industrial Society,” 124. 
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 Thus, in the global subject, there are two main principles. First the global subject 
encompasses a universal moment in the understanding of real people, that is, a humankind 
that can break through the spell of exchange relations and identity thinking. This universal 
moment includes an understanding that we are a species that is susceptible to natural 
threats. It comprises a recognition of our own “inbred nature”, i.e., our embeddedness in 
nature, of the fact that we are natural beings who abide by the same laws and are as 
vulnerable as the rest of the biosphere. We must break down the illusions of the self as 
something distinct from nature that have been constructed over time. This universal 
moment requires education and breaking the spell. 
 The second principle is an active control over the material necessities for 
individuals. Humanity would have control over its own destiny right down to these 
concrete details. Individuals themselves, not large-scale collectives, should have control 
over their own destiny. Society needs to be able to perceive its own subjectivity, and the 
non-identical moment between individual and society, by this I mean the respect that goes 
along with appreciating that all individuals have different needs and wants. The global 
subject would respect Marx’s dictum of “to each according to their needs” which would be 
actually appreciated and taken up. We would rationally reorganize the relations of 
production not out of greed, but out of genuine respect and dignity to ensure that the needs 
of all are met. We all–as a species–would work together no longer in isolation from each 
other to ensure that the needs of all individuals are met.  
One might say that in addition to the “new categorical imperative [that] has been 
imposed by Hitler on … mankind,”84 Adorno may have illuminated the possibility of 
 
84 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 365.  
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another one. The angel of history must look back on the past and understand on a moral 
and conceptual level that we as a species can categorically never let the atrocities of 
Auschwitz happen again. Now although the angel of history can never see behind itself, 
i.e., into the future, it understands conceptually and on a somatic level that the product of 
human history, i.e., the material reality of our social world is disrupting the biosphere on 
unimaginable levels. As Adorno said, “Humanity’s survival is threatened by the forms of 
its own global social constitution,” and this could not be truer in today’s reflections from 
within the Anthropocene.  
Before moving on to Part Two, there are two additional places where Adorno 
mentions the global subject that are worth noting, both of which are found in his 
posthumously published Aesthetic Theory. The first is Adorno’s comment that “ [i]f the 
historical genesis of art works refers back to causal contexts, these do not disappear 
tracelessly in them; the process enacted internally by each and every artwork works back 
on society as the model of a possible praxis in which something on the order of a collective 
subject is constituted.”85 Thus, a global subject (“collective subject” in this translation) can 
be gathered and constituted through conceiving of a possible praxis, for transformation of 
the social order in many ways, including artistic transformation. This is further elaborated 
when Adorno says that “[i]n every successfully realized correction, waiting over the artist’s 
shoulder is a collective subject that has yet to be realized.”86 
Now that Part One has established a through-line of interpretation as to what holds 
the concept of the global subject together in Adorno’s writings, we can move to Part Two. 
 
85 Theodor W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, ed. Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann, trans. Robert Hullot-
Kentor, (London: Continum, 2002), 242.  
86 Ibid., 231.  
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To summarize, Part One has established that the emergence of a global subject is an 
imperative on the entirety of the human species if we intend to survive in the face of a 
threat to our survival such as climate change. The global subject contains two principles 
within it: a conceptual reconciliation and a material reconciliation. And foundationally, 
theory, and society in general, must work on the dialectic of individual and species to bring 
this about. A global subject would be a more individuated human species, but more in tune 
with an understanding of our species-needs. Part Two will bring more nuance and 
complexity to the concept under investigation. Part Two’s discussion of the philosophical 
antecedents to the global subject will bring more substance to what shape this global shape 
may take and illuminate Adorno’s critique of totality.  
Section 2: Situating the Antecedents to the Global Subject.  
Kant on “Humanity: Menschheit” 
In order to more completely understand Adorno’s ideas about a global subject we 
must look at Adorno’s understanding of humanity, since as already noted, In “Progress”, 
Adorno says that to avoid total catastrophe we would require the rational establishment of 
the whole society as humanity. When Adorno is talking about humanity, he brings up Kant, 
and Kant’s concept of Menschheit. Adorno notes that Kant’s doctrine of progress was 
anchored to the “idea of the human being”, and further quotes Kant’s “Idea for a Universal 
History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose,” which offers a good indication of what he thinks 
should be preserved in Kant’s understanding of an established humanity. Kant says:  
The highest purpose of nature- i.e., the development of all natural capacities- can 
be fulfilled only in a society which has not only the greatest freedom, and therefore 
a continual antagonism among its members, but also the most precise specification 
and preservation of the limits of this freedom in order that it can coexist with the 
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freedom of others. The highest task which nature has set for mankind must therefore 
be that of establishing a society in which freedom under external laws would be 
combined to the greatest possible extent with irresistible force, in other words 
establishing a perfectly just civil constitution. For only through the solution and 
fulfillment of this task can nature accomplish its other intentions with our species.87  
Many things are worth noting in this passage from Kant for Adorno. An established 
humanity would have both the greatest freedom, and the precise specification of the limits 
to this freedom. If humankind is to achieve this, it is in virtue of its own antagonisms which 
move toward the kingdom of freedom. Adorno’s understanding of humanity, or what is to 
be preserved in Kant’s dialectically profound conception of humanity, is that it is not a 
“forced unity”, but a unity that comes from the bottom up, through the internal 
development of its contradictions and therefore the actions and freedom of actual living 
human beings who will rationally establish humanity. Adorno explains this further in the 
essay when he says that, “If humanity were a totality that no longer held within it any 
limiting principle, then it would also be free of the coercion that subjects all its members 
to such a principle and thereby would no longer be a totality: no forced unity.”88 A totality 
that holds within it a principle coercing subjects is a forced unity, and Adorno thinks this 
is an inadequate way to think beyond current thought patterns of collectivity and totality.  
 Kant’s “Universal History for a Cosmopolitan Purpose” focuses on the 
development of all human capacities, by the establishment of a “truly just civil 
constitution”. The development of all human capacities for Kant primarily is that of self-
legislation, of setting one’s own ends and for humanity to become a collectivity of morally 
developed individuals. “Kant’s doctrine stands at a watershed.” Adorno says:  
 
87 Adorno quotes this in “Progress,” 144. Kant’s original quote is found in “Idea for a Universal History 
with a Cosmopolitan Purpose”, In Kant Political Writings, 45.  
88 Ibid., 145.  
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In the most sublime passage of his philosophy of history he taught that antagonism, 
the entanglement of progress in myth, in the hold of nature on the domination of 
nature itself, in short, in the kingdom of unfreedom, tends to move by virtue of its 
own law towards the kingdom of freedom. Subsequently, this insight formed the 
basis of Hegel’s ‘cunning of reason’. But if that is the case, then it means nothing 
less than that the possibility of reconciliation is rooted in its own contradiction, that 
the precondition of freedom is the unfreedom that precedes it.89 
Adorno claimed that Kant’s use of the concept of Menschheit is “dialectically profound, 
even though playful.”90 
 But Adorno rejects the Kantian notion of a universal history. Adorno does not agree 
with Kant’s proposition that, “[a]ll the natural capacities of a creature are destined sooner 
or later to be developed completely and in conformity with their own end.”91 Or that “[t]he 
history of the human race as a whole can be regarded as the realization of a hidden plan of 
nature to bring about an internally – and for this purpose also externally – perfect political 
constitution as the only possible state within which all natural capacities of mankind can 
be developed completely.”92 Adorno does not believe in an overriding theodicy, or a reality 
of universal progress such as that posited by Kant. This is an important point because 
humanity, or a “perfectly just civil constitution” is the product of humankind’s labour, and 
it could very well fail to be realized for Adorno.  
Kant understands that the rational faculties, and the good will that they lead to, are 
the only things that are unconditionally good. This is illuminated by his humanity 
formulation of the categorical imperative, i.e., always treat another person not only as a 
means but also an end in itself. The reason one should treat others as ends in themselves is 
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90 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 258. 
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Writings, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B. Nisbet, Second Edition, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991), First proposition. 
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because they have the rational faculties to direct their own lives. They can set their own 
ends. They are self-legislating, and if they have the courage to use their own reason then 
they are mature individuals that ought to be respected.  
 A society with the greatest freedom and precise specifications to the limit of this 
freedom is a cipher for a larger point. Humanity in its entirety ought to take its destiny into 
its own hands and determine itself instead of being heteronomously determined by a myriad 
of external factors. Part of this rational determination is establishing precise specifications 
to freedom’s limits. Individuals have to accommodate the species in their actions. Actions 
that are clearly antagonistic to the survival of the species are not rational and should not be 
pursued. As Adorno says, “[t]he preservation of humanity is inexorably inscribed within 
the meaning of rationality: it has its end in a reasonable organization of society.”93 As I 
have noted already, Adorno is very critical of totality, and he is critical of conceptions of 
humanity that posit an idea, or a conception of what it means to be human as over and 
above individual living humans. This is the dialectically profound point in Kant’s 
conception. The species must accommodate individuals, but at the same time the individual 
must also accommodate the species. 
Continual antagonism and internal differentiation are essential aspects of this 
understanding of totality. A true totality can only consist in individuals acting by way of 
self-legislation under external laws and moving towards a unity. A unity cannot justifiably 
be posited at the outset, unless one intends the absorption of the individual into a coercive 
totality. As Adorno says in “On Subject and Object,” “Undifferentiatedness is not unity, 
 
93 Adorno, “Marginalia to Theory and Praxis”, in Can One Live After Auschwitz?, ed. Rolf Tiedemann, trans 
Rodney Livingstone, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 273.  
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for the latter requires, even according to the Platonic dialectic, diverse entities of which it 
is the unity.”94 Then further on, Adorno makes the further claim that “[p]eace is a state of 
differentiation without domination, with the differentiated participating in each other.”95 
One can further see Adorno’s appreciation for Kant’s ideas when Adorno says, in 
the section of Negative Dialectics titled “Ontical and Ideal Moments” that “Kant must have 
noticed the double meaning of the word “humanity,” as the idea of being human and as the 
totality of all men; he introduced it into theory in a manner that was dialectically profound, 
even though playful.”96 Adorno notes that in Kant’s subsequent usage of the concept of 
humanity, he “vacillates between ontical manners of speech and others that refer to the 
idea.” Adorno’s point here, one that he will critically appropriate in his own work, is that 
Kant neither wants to “cede the idea of humanity to the existing society nor to vaporize it 
into a phantasm.”97 This encapsulates the fact that the concept itself mediates between 
individual living subjects and the species, in other words it encompasses the 
accommodation of each to the other.  
In his first endnote to his translation of the progress essay Henry Pickford reinforces 
this point and mentions that in this essay “Adorno plays on the double meaning of 
Menschheit,”98 in the same way we just seen Adorno praise Kant for doing. This shows 
Adorno’s indebtedness to Kant in appreciating the non-identity that is contained within 
such an emphatic concept. The non-identity contained in this concept concerns the fact that 
humanity is not reducible to a total world spirit, or to an idea of what it is to be a human 
 
94 Theodor W. Adorno, “On Subject and Object”, in Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords, trans. 
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being. But it is neither reducible to a radical individuality that forgets about the universal 
features of the species. Humanity is to be conceived as both the idea of what it means to be 
human that has to be ushered into reality, and the individuals who comprise it. This is a 
thoroughly dialectical conception. 
Now, although Adorno wants to preserve this dual usage of the concept of 
humanity, it is essential that the “eidos” of humanity is still something yet to be realized 
for Adorno. This is where Adorno is moving from the ideas of Kant, to the Hegelian-
Marxist idea of humanity as a product that has to be ushered in by the conscious activity 
of humankind. Kant’s understanding, as we just seen, makes reference to “a teleological 
idea of man whose disposition is such that what he really is, is something that he first has 
to become.”99 But Adorno rejects a teleological conception that humanity will be realized 
through a “hidden plan of nature”. He enthusiastically states “[t]he idea of man is a concept 
that must (and I hope will) soon be energetically worked out.”100  
After Adorno mentions the “famous variant” of the categorical imperative from the 
Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, -the so-called humanity formulation- “Act so 
the humanity, in your person as in every other person, will always be used also as an end, 
never just as a means”101, he mentions that humanity “as the principle of being human, not 
as ‘the sum of all men’ is still unrealized.”102 Furthermore, in Adorno’s essay “On Subject 
and Object” he reiterates this point near the end, when he claims that, “The human being 
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is a result, not an eidos; the insights of Hegel and Marx penetrate all the way into the inmost 
aspects of the so called question of constitution.”103 
 Of paramount importance here is Adorno’s continued mention that even though the 
individual is a  “representative of the socialized human species”, there is currently an 
absolute and irreducible non-identity between the individual and the species, or the social 
mechanism, which operates over their heads and through their heads.”104 This is important 
because of how Adorno is critical of a totality that operates over and through our heads. 
The totality that exists, in quite Hegelian fashion, over individuals’ heads is not rational 
when thinking from the position of the survival of the species or from the position of 
individuals. In fact, Adorno remarks “[a]s opposed to the collective powers that usurp the 
world spirit in the contemporary world, the universal and rational can hibernate better in 
the isolated individual than in the stronger battalions that have obediently abandoned the 
universality of reason.”105  
This is why, for the moment, individuals who have a more progressive 
consciousness must stand in as a placeholder for humanity. An individual such as Greta 
Thunberg with her activism and forms of resistance are more rational than a catastrophic 
societal constitution that carries most along in complacency.106 Adorno himself gives the 
example of Fabian Von Schlabrendorff and his part in the plot to assassinate Hitler.107 In 
another place Adorno says that Peter Altenberg gave voice to this progressive morality 
when he articulated quite concisely the moral outrage that moved Nietzsche to action, when 
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he collapsed in Turin when he saw the mistreatment of a horse.108 It is here Adorno remarks 
that, “[p]rogress is encoded in a concept that all camps today unanimously defame, that of 
decadence.”109 At this point in time, Adorno does not think that consensus is more rational 
than an individual’s reason necessarily. As he says, “to know the truth, one needs that 
irreducibly individual reason that is . . . supposedly obsolete.”110 This is why Adorno in 
“On Subject and Object” posits Kant’s transcendental subject as a cipher for society, or the 
conceptual and material prison that is felt by individuals as a consequence of the capitalist 
system. The irreducibly individual reason was present in these examples that went against 
the objective reason that held priority.  
Given Adorno’s insistence of the non-identity between the individual and the 
species, it only makes sense to interpret his usage of “humanity” as something that would 
resemble neither the totality as it exists today nor be comprised of individuals as they 
currently exist. Humanity is neither one nor the other, but something distinctive yet to be 
realized. There is a reconciliation that has to take place between individuals and the species, 
and this is what needs to be realized. This will be realized when collectively we realize that 
any human created system can be resisted and changed. Ursula LeGuin sounded this 
Adornoian point when she said, “We live in capitalism. Its power seems inescapable- but 
then, so did the divine right of kings. Any human power can be resisted and changed by 
human beings.”111 
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 Adorno says that, “the possibility of progress…has migrated to such a real, not 
merely formal, global social subject.”112 In Negative Dialectics he again focuses on this 
dialectic of Menschheit when he says:  
Humanity, the human potential in men, may well be meant as a regulative ideal; 
humanity as the principle of being human, not as the “sum of all men”, is still 
unrealized. Even so, we cannot shake off the factual, substantive increment in the 
word: that every individual should be respected as a representative of the socialized 
human species, that he is not a mere function of the exchange process.113 
This tension in Adorno serves to illuminate more than it obscures. Adorno is being much 
more dialectical in his usage of the term. His usage retains the non-identity of individual 
and society, and at the same time it implies that there could be a reconciliation between the 
human potential in individuals and a society where individuals are not reduced to a mere 
function of the exchange process. The individual subject ought to be united with the 
universal interest of the species. 114  Part of the logic of the self-preservation of the 
individual is that it should be extended to embrace the conception of the self-preservation 
of the species.”115 This requires radical critique and transformation.  
The idea of the non-identical is an essential part of this critique of totality. Adorno 
points to the fact that when the universal concept is posited to characterize an individual it 
is always inadequate. “Objects do not go into their concepts without remainder.”116 Further 
in Negative Dialectics Adorno says that, “[n]egative dialectics allows us to recognize the 
difference that has been spirited away.”117 This “difference” that has been spirited away is 
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the radical particularity of things and individuals when one classifies and characterizes 
individuals under the concept of species. Individuality and the “non-identical moment” are 
lost or spirited away by the tradition of identity thinking, or classifying particulars under 
universals without an adequate reflection of their non-identity. This is important when 
considering what it means to be a human, and what our “species-being” is. Adorno’s 
conception of humanity is indebted not only to Kant, but Marx and Hegel for this reason. 
Marx particularly established a pluralistic understanding of our species-being that Adorno 
is drawing on as an outgrowth and development on Kant’s conception of humanity.   
So the importance of Kant in influencing Adorno’s idea of humanity is 
multifaceted. Firstly, Adorno thinks that the transcendental and empirical subject in the 
Kantian system of philosophy is a cipher for society, i.e., society’s coercive conceptuality 
and the irreducible individual. This Kantian dichotomy reveals the non-identity that is 
inherent in the present state of society and the individuals who comprise it. Individuals are 
not fully identical with the social totality that pressures them to conform. In our society 
Adorno sees the principle of exchange, identity, and fungibility as positing an identity 
between individuals themselves and the species, but this is false. Secondly, because of this 
non-identity, humanity must be understood as a reconciliation of the antagonisms between 
the individual and the species, and that would represent the human species breaking 
through a false totality. Thirdly, humanity must be self-legislating. Humanity must take its 
destiny into its own hands and rationally establish itself. Humanity must emerge by 
becoming mature in the Kantian sense of individuals. Humanity involves seeing the 
individual’s freedom as depending on a conception of the species as free.   
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 The connection here between Menschheit and species-being is that each is 
concerned with a self-determining human species comprised of self-determining 
individuals. While Kant focused primarily on self-determination through reason and self-
legislation, Marx and Hegel with the idea of species-being made this central, but made the 
further important claim that individuals have to have the freedom to translate this self-
determination into labour, i.e., actually working on the objective world via conscious plans 
and as universal beings.  
 Species-being provides Adorno with the conceptual tool to be able to overcome the 
appeal to teleology of the Kantian system, avoiding an appeal to “nature’s plan” he puts 
the destiny of our species in our own hands. Species-being, as it was in Hegel and Marx, 
was that of labour, not just determining through reason our own ends, but actually being 
able to labour and objectify those conscious plans into the natural world to help create a 
social world according to our aspirations as rational subjects and as a species.  
Marx and Hegel on “Species-Being: Gattungswesen”  
Hegel was an important intervention into the question of species-being, freedom 
and autonomy. In his work, Hegel explicitly took up the Kantian focus on the centrality of 
freedom, calling his philosophy a philosophy of freedom. His critique of the Kantian 
conception of freedom is that it was only a “negative” conception of freedom existing only 
in the individual’s self-legislation. The Philosophy of Right articulates the position that 
self-legislation is not enough. There have to be real world places and institutions for 
individuals to actually pursue and determine their own freedom. Individual freedom is only 
realized as social freedom. Adorno agrees with this, but, he critiques Hegel for identarian 
thinking because Hegel posits that the existing conditions of the bourgeois social order, 
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were sufficient grounds to make the metaphysical claim that the relation between society 
and individuals in the 19th century was indicative of the best possible constitution of 
humanity. Marx borrowed this idea of freedom from Hegel and thought that freedom did 
not come from a single willing agent, such as what is posited in the Kantian system of 
philosophy but is only understood as a wider societal phenomenon. Another way to put this 
same point is that individuals have to understand themselves as a part of a larger species 
or society, and only then, when humankind understands and transforms the world to be 
hospitable towards their own ends as a species, can it truly be free.  
Adorno’s critique of Hegel follows two central points. First, as I just mentioned 
Adorno charges Hegel for identarian thinking and therefore thinks Hegel does not respect 
the non-identical. Adorno sees Hegel as positing a universal world spirit as above and 
through individuals’ heads, where the individual is merely a conduit for the larger 
rationality of absolute spirit. Adorno sees Hegel’s philosophy as one that engulfs the 
individual into the totality, and therefore only holds to one side of the dialectic of humanity. 
Now whether Adorno’s characterization of the Hegelian system is accurate or not is not of 
much importance here. The important point is the intervention of Hegel into this discussion 
with his focus on social freedom, i.e., there have to be places in the world to exercise and 
guarantee freedom instead of freedom merely consisting in “obeying one’s own law” as it 
is in Kant. In addition to this, Hegel’s focus on rationality being tied to an understanding 
of one’s membership in spirit, and therefore to the species is an important connection here 
with Marx.  
 Marx’s discussion of humankind’s species-being comes in the famous section of 
the 1844 Manuscripts titled “Estranged Labour”. It is in this section that Marx, looks more 
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closely at the objectification of the labour of the working class, and the estrangement that 
follows. It is here that Marx explains the different types of alienation that accompany the 
capitalist mode of production. First, the worker is alienated from the product of his or her 
labour, i.e., the objectification of the worker’s talents and skills into the material world as 
a commodity is ripped away from them and owned by the capitalist.  
 Secondly, the worker is not only alienated from the product, but this alienation is 
embedded in the very labouring activity of the worker. The work and labour of the 
individual is therefore external to the worker, “he does not affirm himself but denies 
himself, does not feel content but unhappy, does not develop freely his physical and mental 
energy but mortifies his body and ruins his mind.” 118  Thus workers cannot realize 
themselves when they work; their self-conception is secondary and only exists on the 
weekend.  
 The third aspect of estranged labour is the fact that estranged labour turns man’s 
species being, into a being alien to him, into a means to his individual existence.119 This 
will be important to explore further because Adorno thinks that the full capacity of 
individuals is stunted by capitalism and they are forced to only think of their individual 
subsistence in competition with others to the detriment of wider productive activities.  
  Marx says about our species-being that,  
Man is a species being, not only because in practice and in theory he adopts the 
species as his object (his own as well as those of other things), but – and this is only 
another way of expressing it- but also because he treats himself as the actual, living 
species; because he treats himself as a universal and therefore free being.120 
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Man is a species being because he is a being that can understand himself as a 
member of a species, and therefore escape the direct relation of an individual animal to 
their life (species) activity. Species-being for Marx is what distinguishes the individuals of 
our species from any other animals on the planet. The character of a species is contained 
in the character of its life-activity. Marx describes our life activity as that of “free conscious 
activity”. Truly human activity is human activity that is determined by the labourer through 
his or her own free conscious activity.  
The animal is immediately identical with its life-activity. It does not distinguish 
itself from it. It is its life-activity. Man makes his life-activity itself the object of 
his will and of his consciousness. He has conscious life activity.121 
 Another aspect of Marx’s discussion of species-being, a point which Adorno made 
as well, is that “[an animal] produces one-sidedly, while man produces universally. An 
animal produces only under the dominion of immediate physical need, while man produces 
even when he is free from physical need and only truly produces in freedom therefrom.122 
Marx’s assertion is clear. Man’s species-being is that of free-conscious activity, i.e., 
humans can determine for themselves through their own faculties what to do. And the 
species can only truly produce when they are free from the immediate physical needs that 
preoccupy the labour of mere animals.   
 One of the central insights Marx offered us on this topic is his pluralist 
understanding of what our species-character is. Marx critiques previous understandings of 
human nature as identifying one human activity and reifying it to be the metaphysical 
characteristic of human beings. The sixth thesis on Feuerbach shows how Marx was against 
such an idea of reifying the human essence into a theoretical phenomenon. Instead, the 
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human essence is contained dialectically with “the ensemble of social relations.”123 The 
question of the human being cannot be asked in abstraction from any actual practical 
expression, in other words, it cannot be abstracted from the actual labouring activities of 
human beings because labouring is what humans do. And as humans social relations 
change, so will their ability to use this capacity.   
 This idea provides part of the foundation for a critique of capitalism for Marx. If 
humans have the capacity to understand themselves as part of a species, and objectively 
determine their life activities, then capitalism effectively and systematically places 
restrictions on that aspect of human life and forces the overwhelming majority of 
humankind to struggle for individual survival. Humans have the capacity- as labour under 
capitalism shows- to produce and act on behalf of something larger than ourselves: the 
species. There is no saying what a human species could look like if we unleased this 
capacity from its constraints under capitalism. What we can say is that humans have this 
capacity, but we cannot say it is the nature- in a metaphysical sense- of our species because 
we have no epistemological access to what a species would look like if all its labour were 
directed towards the benefit of the species. But, if we have this capacity and it is stunted 
by capitalism, as Marx and Adorno both thought was the case, than humans cannot produce 
as “free and universal beings” until the other influences on labour are dealt with. Marx 
said, the human being “truly produces in freedom from such need”. Which is certainly 
among the premises underlying Adorno’s agreement with Horkheimer’s point that 
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“[f]reedom is not the freedom to accumulate, but the fact that I have no need to 
accumulate.124 
Marx’s analysis points out a problem with labour under capitalism: “[t]he 
consciousness which man has of his species is thus transformed by estrangement in such a 
way that the species life becomes for him a means.”125 Adorno is making the same point 
when he is talking about the surrendering of the task of self-preservation to the capitalist 
system. This act forces people to think of their own individual survival (by labouring as a 
means to make a paycheck) instead of the survival of the species and the development of 
all our free conscious capacities. It limits our “universal being” to a false focus on our 
“particular being”. People are under the illusion that their survival and development is 
antagonistic to everyone else’s and this is a false human construction. We need to unite 
under the principle of the survival of the species because an individual’s existence is 
inconceivable without the species. We must find a situation where we can unite human 
beings and their universal capacity, so that we can put the species’ survival as the number 
one priority. It is only by doing this can the species enter a truly free state of developing 
all human capacities.  
“Thus, Marx sees human freedom as dependent upon our ability to produce objects 
according to our conscious plans.”126 Capitalism, has brought about a world where our 
potential is systematically stunted, reducing the human being to a mere animal.127 These 
boundaries of human labour that result in alienation could be removed, and we could 
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establish actual rational limits with the species and individuals in mind. But Adorno is also 
saying that capitalism does not only stunt the human species and the full development of 
its capacities, it is leading to its total destruction.  
In a reconciled world for Adorno, the species will be reflected in individuals, and 
individuals will reflect the species, particularly when it comes to our productive activities. 
There has to be a dialectic between these two, there has to be communication between the 
species and the individual. Humanity today is destroying itself because the social world 
fails to take into account the needs of individuals, including the need for clean air, water, 
adequate housing, the need to not be in a constant state of anxiety and most significantly 
the need for the human species to continue.  
Taking the species as an object of thought and acting as a self-directed individual 
in accordance with one’s membership therein is essential to both Marx and Adorno’s 
accounts. Having the species as an object of thought allows social labour to escape the 
closed circle of necessity. Instead of every individual staring at the ground, the human 
species would finally look around to its fellow humans and explore its potential. Adorno 
says in “Progress” that “[r]eality’s spell over spirit prevents spirit from doing what its own 
concept wants to do when faced with the merely existent: to fly.”128 
 Herbert Marcuse says in commenting on this aspect of Marx, “Man’s nature lies in 
his universality. His intellectual and physical faculties can be fulfilled only if all men exist 
as men, in a developed wealth of their human resources. Man is free only if all men are 
free and exist as universal beings.”129 But all humans are not free at the moment because 
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this type of activity that is characteristic of its life-activity is systematically contained under 
the current system. Individuals today have a limited sphere of activity to produce as 
“species-beings”. When individuals go to work the majority are labouring for the welfare 
of greater numbers of people than just themselves. Their labour is extended beyond mere 
individual necessity, but by the nature of capitalism it is mediated in every direction by 
private interest. What would a species look like, and how far could it develop if this 
capacity for free-conscious activity went towards the welfare of all human beings instead 
of being directed by private and corporate interest?  We do not know what the species will 
be like until all humans can exist as universal beings. This is why it is so important to not 
cede the idea of humanity to the existent; the species is a product for Kant, Hegel, Marx, 
and Adorno.  
 Marcuse, again in Reason and Revolution insightfully comments on Marx’s 
concept of species being. He says that,  
Man is free only if all men are free and exist and exist as ‘universal beings’. When 
this condition is attained, life will be shaped by the potentialities of the genus, Man, 
which embraces the potentialities of all the individuals that comprise it. The 
emphasis on this universality brings nature as well into the self-development of 
mankind.130 
 
Man is only free if all men are free as universal beings and life will actually be 
shaped by humankind, consciously. This means that revolutionary change has to aim at the 
liberation of all human beings and cannot settle for less. Now it is necessary to investigate 
the state of the proletariat today, and Adorno’s ideas about it. 
Establishing humanity would be an internally differentiated, more individuated, 
and antagonistic “totality” that self-legislates and has “perfect” freedom under external 
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laws through a just civil constitution. This Kantian influenced notion of humanity is made 
more concrete with the notion of species-being. In order to foster mature individuals who 
could rationally self-legislate themselves into a kingdom of ends, we have to allow human 
activity to be directed towards universality, and to develop all human capacities which are 
not inimical to the survival of our species. Through the capitalist mode of production, 
humans were forced to produce for larger groups than their family, this allowed thought to 
wander to greater heights and ultimately to the species itself. But it is now time to fully 
develop this ability if we want to prevent the most destructive scenario our current societal 
constitution brings.  
This notion of free conscious activity, as a potential identity for our species could 
be established if we were able to effectively neutralize or abolish late-capitalism’s 
coercion, but it is not so simple. This is a complex matter. There are real consequences to 
this coercion, such as the weakening of the ego, and manufactured scarcity on the 
individual. This points towards some of the impediments to a global subject. Adorno would 
not think that our species being-today is that of free conscious activity, but he is pointing 
to the fact that in establishing humanity we could find out what humans are really like. 
Thus, we need to look at Adorno’s ideas about the proletariat and political praxis because 
the failure of Marxist revolutionary praxis to usher in this kind of reality requires a 
reflection on revolutionary theory. “If the transformation of the world failed, its 
interpretation also requires re-thinking.”131 And the failure of the Marxist revolutionary 
praxis had world-historical significance for Adorno.132 
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Adorno’s Ideas About the Proletariat 
Despite the theoretical headway we have made in assessing the concept of the 
global subject, and its philosophical antecedents, the practical side has to now be addressed. 
One of Adorno’s central concerns was critiquing and assessing the relationship between 
theory and praxis. A critical social theory needs to address why the moment of philosophy’s 
realization had failed. Why is there still hunger, poverty, and human suffering despite the 
technological and scientific resources to eliminate them altogether? This section will deal 
with Adorno’s thoughts about the relation between theory and praxis, and it will begin 
through his assessment of the proletariat.  
Adorno is often criticized for not providing a blueprint for the future and 
revolutionary activity. He has been criticized for offering no substantive alternatives and 
was even criticized in his day for being too reactionary. Any thoughts about Adorno and 
revolutionary praxis are stained by the now famous event when Adorno called the police 
in 1969 on students occupying the university in Frankfurt. But with this in mind, Adorno 
does not deserve the criticism that he was inconsistent with his own theory, and too 
reactionary for a truly revolutionary thinker. Fabian Freyenhagen, in his partial defence of 
Adorno, forcefully argues that Adorno’s decision to call the police on the students 
occupying the university is not inconsistent with the practical implications of his critical 
theory.133 Adorno simply did not think that the world could be changed at that time.  
As Freyenhagen aptly notes in the aforementioned article, Adorno’s ideas about 
theory and praxis must be understood in light of Marx’s statement that,  
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The thing to be done at any definite given moment of the future, the thing 
immediately to be done, depends of course entirely on the given historical 
conditions in which one has to act. 134  
 
It is in his essay, “Reflections on Class Theory” that Adorno stakes out his position 
in relation to Marx in thinking about class theory. Marx’s prediction of the overcoming of 
capitalism through a proletariat revolution did not come true. This is an essential tenet of 
Adorno’s philosophy that the given historical conditions are different now. As he says at 
the beginning of Negative Dialectics, “Philosophy, which once seemed obsolete, lives on 
because the moment to realize it was missed.”135 Philosophy’s realization would have been 
a socialist revolution at the beginning of the 20th century when the proletariat still had a 
class consciousness. But Adorno, in thinking about the fundamental structure of class 
society today, thinks that things are indeed different. Marx’s analysis of class society needs 
to be critiqued and thought through in our contemporary world of late capitalism. 
Specifically, for revolutionary praxis to become possible again, it needs a renewed analysis 
of the present situation and its constraints.  
In this essay Adorno firmly asserts himself to be still a Marxist in the sense that he 
too believes that history has always been the history of class struggles.136 And today the 
concept is as important as the day it was penned. But on the other hand, we must also be 
aware that there have been structural transformations in capital since Marx’s time that need 
to be re-examined. Adorno makes the Hegelian claim that there needs to be a sublation 
(Aufhebung) of the concept of class under monopoly capital.137 The concept of class needs 
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to be preserved because “[i]ts basis, the division of society into exploiters and exploited, 
not only continues unabated, but is increasing in coercion and solidity.”138 But, on the other 
hand, class must be questioned because the exploited cannot experience themselves as a 
class today. The bourgeoise, or more precisely the disenfranchised bourgeoise, have been 
engulfed into one mass class of all exploited members of society that fails to recognize 
itself as a class and understand their emancipatory power. There is no subjective awareness 
in monopoly capitalism of participating in a class.  
Adorno in “Towards a New Manifesto” quotes Nietzsche and says that society 
today is one where there is “No herdsman and one herd.”139 He continues that there is a 
“kind of false classless society. Society finds itself on the way to what looks like the perfect 
classless society but is in reality the very opposite.”140 It is in reality its very opposite 
because there continue to be exploited and exploiters in present society. Objectively the 
exploitation immanent to capitalism is still there, yet the subjective side of class 
consciousness is missing. It is difficult for the CEO of a company, moving papers from one 
side of his desk to the other, to establish a class consciousness with the construction worker 
building our roads, or the McDonald’s employee working the front counter. However, all 
of them are integrated, oppressed by the system and are objectively exploited. Exploitation 
is intrinsic to the system. All human beings objectively have real interest in establishing a 
collective consciousness in order to mitigate their alienation and therefore suffering. 
Adorno says in History and Freedom that,  
Mankind has reached a point today where even those on the commanding heights 
cannot enjoy their positions because even these have been whittled away to the 
point where they are merely functions of their own function. Even captains of 
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industry spend their time working through mountains of documents shifting them 
from one side of their desk to the other, instead of ignoring office hours and 
reflecting on freedom.141 
In “Late Capitalism or Industrial Society” Adorno furthers his engagement in an 
analysis of the question of “whether the capitalist system still predominates according to 
its model, however modified, or whether the development of industry has rendered the 
concept of capitalism obsolete.”142 Or this question can also be put, is Marx out of date?  
 Adorno says there is no clear yes or no answer that can be given to these kinds of 
questions. But, as a “initial, necessarily abstract answer”, for critique to build on, Adorno 
says that contemporary society is an industrial society in its forces of production,143 while 
capitalist in its relations of production.144 
Adorno follows Marx when he makes the point that the forces of production, or the 
means of production which encompass the technological and scientific potential to 
eliminate want and oppression, are different from the relations of production. The relations 
of production are the social relations between the owners of the means of production, the 
oligarchy that is truly influencing the direction of the productive apparatus, and workers. 
Relations of production remain capitalist because capital is still highly concentrated, and 
people are still appendages of the machine.145  
Yet, in monopoly capitalism the ruling class is now hidden behind an invisible 
concentration of wealth which makes resistance all the more difficult. The root of 
understanding capitalism as it is today, Adorno says, lies in how capitalist relations of 
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production have come to dominate society as a whole, leading to extreme, albeit often 
invisible, concentrations of wealth and power.146 The relations of production have proved 
to me more flexible than Marx had expected.147 
In addition to this, Adorno mentions that with the intervention of the welfare state, 
Marx’s immiseration thesis no longer holds, and the ruling class effectively secures “for 
slaves their existence within slavery in order to ensure its own.”148 The will to get into the 
streets and demand a revolution is not nearly as high as it once was, partly because there is 
more to lose than just one’s chains. This means that people are complacent with their home, 
phone, car, etc., with their minimal freedom because it is the means for their individual 
existence. But these commodities that they exchange the majority of their life-activity for, 
are in abundance. Despite this abundance, people are still forced to compete with others 
and therefore think of their survival as in some way in competition with others. In a society 
where one is forced into the rat-race, Adorno says that, “[m]aking oneself the same, 
becoming civilized, fitting in, uses up all the energy that might be used to do things 
differently. 149  And “[n]eed satisfaction now appears more rational than collective 
action.”150 In other words it appears more rational to submit and go to work than to protest 
and demand systematic change.  
With the intervention of the welfare state, people enjoy an increased standard of 
living, shorter work days, improved conditions, etc. The welfare state contributes to the 
invisibility of classes by masking class relations. In the current state of mass society, and 
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the increasing invisibility of classes, reification has increased as well. There is now societal 
level reification. The way of the world transforms human beings and their life-activity into 
formally commensurable variations of the exchange relationship.151 And therefore the real 
social relations, or the real “subjectivity” that underlies capitalism, are veiled from 
individuals and reified into a perceived objectivity relating objects to objects.  
The new mass class is objectively the agent of revolution but subjectively it is not 
precisely because it lacks consciousness of itself as a class. The mass class lacks central 
characteristics that Marx attributed to an agent of revolution, i.e., having a class 
consciousness and the need (through Marx’s immiseration thesis) to get into the streets and 
demand revolution. Classes have been sublated into one mass class which makes the 
prospects for class consciousness even more difficult, as I previously alluded to with the 
example of the CEO and the McDonalds employee. And therefore at least in Adorno’s time 
it was not a revolutionary moment for these reasons. These are some of Adorno’s 
reflections on the proletariat, and they reveal that revolutionary activity has to take a 
different route today. The global subject as the agent of revolution has to liberate the 
entirety of humanity, partly by thinking about how these impediments can be overcome 
today.  
Reflections on Maturity and Praxis 
The lack of a subjective aspect of class consciousness leads into some of Adorno’s 
comments on the state of education and praxis today. Everything is fungible under the 
bourgeoise principle of exchange. Individuals are liquidated into functions of the 
productive apparatus and only retain a pseudo-individuality; people are degraded, and the 
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ego is weakened. Individuals now exhibit more follow the leader tendencies in opposition 
to critical reflection. These impediments to social solidarity are contained in Adorno’s 
adoption of the Kantian idea of “immaturity,” i.e., along with Kant, Adorno believes that 
for the most part, we are unable to use our own reasoning abilities without the guidance of 
authority figures.152 The collectives and social movements of monopoly capitalism at the 
moment are inadequate for true change because of these impediments to social solidarity 
and the formation of strong individuals who can resist. 
Moreover, since Adorno’s critique of the present state of society is heavily 
influenced by his ideas about the immaturity of individuals, and the false totality that 
asserts itself over and through their heads, I will move to a brief discussion of Adorno’s 
ideas about “education for maturity”, and how the concept of maturity can be useful to help 
understand how to combat the increasing threats of our time. In Problems of Moral 
Philosophy, moreover, he associated self-reflection with morality when he said that “the 
element of self-reflection has today become the true heir to what used to be called moral 
categories.”153  
Before Adorno’s untimely death in 1969, a radio broadcast was made of a 
conversation between him and Hellmut Becker on the topic of “Education for Maturity and 
Responsibility”. It is here that Adorno clearly and lucidly articulates that a quintessential 
element of democracy is the education of individuals in “political, social, and moral 
awareness”. Democracy necessitates a population that has the courage to make full use of 
its reasoning power. In order to clarify this further, Adorno refers to Kant’s now famous 
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essay “An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?” and his discussion there of 
Mündigkeit, i.e., maturity and responsibility. It is in this essay that Kant famously says that 
enlightenment is “man’s release from his self-incurred tutelage”. This means that 
Unmündigkeit, translated often as immaturity and irresponsibility, is one’s own fault if it 
originates in a lack of courage to use one’s own reason without the guidance of another.154 
Adorno claims that Kant’s understanding is “extraordinarily up-to-date”.155 
Becker and Adorno agree that education is entirely inadequate. Education as it was 
practiced then, which remains unchanged today, is too authoritarian and conformist. The 
education system as a whole does not focus on maturity in the Kantian sense, rather “order 
and commitment are being advocated and seen as good in themselves, with a total lack of 
concern about how things stand with regard to autonomy, and therefore to maturity.”156 
What is more, it is not surprising that Becker and Adorno agree, considering the 
critique of totality that we have been following throughout this paper, that “the question of 
maturity is a global problem”.157 Education as it is being conducted today is forming 
pseudo-individuals. This means that individuals today are determined heteronomously 
instead of autonomously. This is particularly true in the 21st century and the explosion of 
the culture industry and its infiltration into the internet, i.e., the place many go to educate 
themselves. The problem is thus the following: how do we educate for “protest and 
resistance”, how do we “open people’s minds to the fact that they are constantly being 
deceived”?158 
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Adorno clearly thought, not only that there were few prospects for the social 
solidarity needed for a revolution, but he further indicted the global education system in its 
unreflective propagation of the very thing undermining a truly human society. The problem 
is, as Robert French and Jem Thomas concisely put it, the need to resolve the paradox in 
the “idea of an education that is at once authoritative and non-conformist”, which Adorno 
and Becker failed to do.159 It is with these ideas about the education system undermining 
the very individuals we need to overcome an oppressive system, that I turn to Adorno’s 
thoughts about political praxis, which mirror a very similar problem to his indictment of 
education. 
The disintegration of the social consciousness into different factions of society 
represents a real threat to the prospects for social solidarity. Each faction of society, 
whether it is online social media that reaffirms one’s beliefs, or social clubs, or schools, 
promotes conformism. In an age of alternative facts people are experiencing different 
information in separate spaces on the internet because of corporate interests that dominate 
the flow of information. This really is the objectification of pseudo-individuality. 
Algorithms that are created and dominated by corporate interests determine what 
information one sees, what products one buys, and what news comes across one’s internet 
feed. People are being fed their own ideologies right back to them in a self-perpetuating 
cycle which perpetuates the state of reification in society.  
This really is the perfect manifestation of capitalism’s ideological baggage. Marx’s 
famous analysis of the fetishism of commodities which results in societal level reification 
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that we can clearly see now, makes a literally reified world of information and commodities 
that mediate most individual’s interaction with the outside world. The point is the 
following: the internet has now posed a dialectical problem like no other, posing limitations 
and possibilities towards the hope for human solidarity and quick human action when 
needed, while contributing to the formation of pseudo-individuals.  
In “Marginalia to Theory and Praxis” Adorno observed and commented on forms 
of political praxis. Ultimately Adorno comes to say that praxis has to be deferred because 
we are not in a revolutionary situation yet, praxis as it currently exists has fascist 
tendencies. Forms of collective action and revolutionary praxis tend toward a follow-the-
charismatic-leader style according to Adorno. There is no real discussion among people 
across political lines. There is no real discussion within groups. “Behind this ploy lies an 
authoritarian principle: the dissenter must adopt the group’s opinion.” “Discussion serves 
manipulation”160  
This pseudo-activity, i.e., inadequate forms of social solidarity in praxis, reveals 
the connection between the inadequate forms of praxis, and the pseudo-individuality that 
concerns Adorno about education as it exists today. Again in “Marginalia to Theory and 
Praxis”, Adorno says that “[w]orld history once again produces in parody the kind of 
people whom it in fact needs.”161 By contrast, “the sole adequate praxis would be to put all 
energies toward working our way out of barbarism.”162 This is why Adorno comes to say 
that we need a new form of collectivity. We need a new way of understanding how to 
achieve our goals as collectives without slipping into the tendencies of old ways of thought. 
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We need more individuals to be leaders and not falling into conformity and thus fascist 
tendencies.  
Old ways of structuring movements did not stray too far from hierarchically 
organized movements. We need new ideas about action. Instead of top down action we 
need lateral and horizontal action. For example, the Gilets Jaunes in France are a good 
example of something different for example, they have been described as amorphous; they 
have no leader. There is no clear leader that is informing people what to do, they are 
laterally demanding action. The Hong Kong democracy protests in their present form have 
no clear old-fashioned hierarchical structure to it either. We need less vertical and more 
horizontal forms of organization. This is why the Gilets Jaunes, and the protests in Hong 
Kong are important.  Climate change movements on the other hand, seem to be 
progressively falling backward. People are idolizing big celebrities that come out as 
advocates, or placing a lot of hope on a young Swedish girl’s shoulders for example. And 
if the movement continues in this way, it will fail. The interesting and promising aspect 
about climate change rebellion is that the only way for it to be successful is a radically 
individualized and democratized approach to the problem. It cannot be solved but through 
horizontal action.  
Conclusion 
What type of real-world revolutionary activity does Adorno advocate? What kind 
of revolutionary activity does Adorno’s negative dialectics lead to? Commentary on 
Adorno’s ideas about political activism and revolution broadly takes two forms. There is 
one criticism that sees Adorno as residing in the “Grand Hotel Abyss” and presents him as 
“an elitist mandarin who refused to engage in resistance to the socio-economic conditions 
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that he criticized for more than four decades”.163 The second focus of commentators is on 
Adorno’s advocacy of a rigorous critique of existing conditions, and his view that critique 
is the form of praxis that needs to be taken up today because theory has priority in the 
current conditions.164  
It is part of my claim in this paper that one reason why Adorno’s thoughts on 
revolution or political activism have been hitherto misunderstood and obscured is because 
the global subject has not been shown to be the missing link in the discussion, or in other 
words a non-totalitarian understanding of collectivity. To put it another way, the missing 
link could be said to be Adorno’s advocation of a “negative totality”. The global subject is 
the foundation of a positive political praxis in Adorno’s work. 
There should be no mistakes made about the fact that the immanent demand on the 
human species that Adorno makes- in the name of the global subject- is a call to revolution. 
The global subject would be the establishment of humanity, but it is essentially the 
revolutionary subject that humanity needs to prevent total catastrophe and annihilation. 
The establishment of the global subject would be the moment of philosophy’s realization.  
Adorno is certainly still a Marxist in the sense that he thinks that humanity is a 
product that comes at the end of revolution. This may contradict some people’s false 
conception of Adorno. Some have presented Adorno as putting off the importance of 
revolution as not the most important demand on humankind. But in “Towards a New 
Manifesto”, a lucid conversation on theory and practice between Adorno and Horkheimer, 
Adorno claims that “[t]he fact that art exists is not rendered immaterial by the statement 
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that what really counts is revolution.”165 This is a difficult comment to unpack. Adorno 
seems to be gesturing towards the fact that art is a revolutionary weapon, but we cannot 
simply take refuge in revolutionary expression or art. Everything comes down to the 
question of whether humanity can prevent catastrophe, and whether humanity can prevent 
catastrophe comes down to whether humanity is capable of establishing a revolution where 
it takes control over its own destiny. That is not rendered immaterial by of the fact that art 
still exists.   
Zuidervart’s book Social Philosophy after Adorno claims that Adorno does not 
have a sufficient theory of democracy or political and legal institutions to support a truly 
transformational theory of society. But we must look again at what Adorno thought genuine 
progress or success would look like. Adorno thinks it would be quite presumptuous to think 
one has epistemological access to what types of institutions would carry the species 
forward, because this is the very task we need to figure out. “Progress really does mean the 
avoidance of total catastrophe.” Today we are facing utter catastrophe and it is embedded 
in every action we take, and everything we see (commodities). In order to conduct life, as 
monopoly capitalism defines life, i.e., selling labour or attempting to build a business to 
survive, one cannot but contribute to the destruction of the planet and humanity’s collective 
suicide.  
This is why Adorno’s radical understanding of democracy and a global subject 
necessitates a humanity that has “control down to the concrete details”, and humanity 
means “an extreme form of differentiation not as a generic concept.” What does this mean? 
We need everyone, all individuals to have control over the resources that determine their 
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lives, so that their lives are not determined by a “false totality”. Humanity can finally take 
control and become “the subject of its own history”, because humanity is a universal being. 
We will be free only when we no longer have to spend our entire lives searching for the 
means to satisfy our needs.  
What would a non-dominating, a non-integrated form of praxis be? One does not 
have the epistemic privilege to say. But what we do know is having a class society as it 
exists today is leading to our extinction. Therefore, the threat of climate catastrophe 
necessitates a sustainable and radical understanding of the way the means of production 
ought to be decentralized and democratized to help. The climate crisis necessitates that a 
revolution be undertaken in the relations and forces of production, then thereafter a social 
revolution will follow because the human being is defined by its social relations and at the 
moment through critique we have pinpointed the central task of the revolution: the 
destruction of an oil based and carbon emitting society. What we are missing is the critical 
social consciousness to accompany and push this revolution forward. And I think Adorno 
provides central insights into this. It is our task to conceive of a new form of collectivity to 
preserve our species. A large weight is on our shoulders at the current time in the earth’s 
history.  
What I have attempted to show in this paper is that the global subject 
[Gesamtsubjekt] is a central concept in understanding Adorno’s philosophical outlook. It 
is an emphatic concept that brings together many of Adorno’s other central ideas and needs 
to be understood, critiqued, and focused on as focal point to which they all point. The 
concept of the global subject is an attempt to bring together his concepts of reconciliation, 
non-identity between individual and society, utopia, determinate negation and more. The 
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concept of the global subject brings together Adorno’s understanding of what true progress 
would be for mankind, i.e., the avoidance of total catastrophe. The possibility for the human 
species to avoid total catastrophe has migrated to the global subject alone, and “everything 
else involving progress must crystalize around it.” The global subject would be “a human 
race that possesses genuine control over its own destiny right down to the concrete details.” 
The global subject is Adorno’s call to revolution, but it is not a blind revolution, it must be 
adequately steered by theory, but not reducible to it.  
Most importantly, the global subject embodies Adorno’s insistence that theory 
should critique and seek no less than the complete transformation of society in its entirety. 
What is more, theory should not only seek the ground for a global subject, but it is a 
categorical imperative on mankind to establish one before our extinction by our own hand.  
I gather there to be two central tenets of a global subject, i.e., a material and 
conceptual reconciliation with nature. A material reconciliation with nature means that the 
metabolism between our forces of production and the natural world will approach harmony, 
while guaranteeing a democratization of the control of these resources to the people. The 
conceptual reconciliation comes from a new understanding of us and our “inbred nature”, 
the natural world, and the relationship between them.  
The global subject would be a more fully individuated humanity. It would be a 
“negative totality”. This means that the dialectical conception of humanity brought down 
to us from Kant would establish itself as a “real totality”, i.e., a real species taking control 
of its destiny by consciously determining its nature and path to survival. I call this a 
negative totality because it is a totality that is not posited at the outset, but one that comes 
together into a unity by its very rejection and negation of the false totality that plagues it at 
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the current moment – capitalist totality. It is a negative totality because it is “diverse entities 
coming together as a unity”166 in a state of “differentiation without domination, with the 
differentiated participating in each other.”167  
As I have shown Adorno is influenced by Kant’s understanding of Menschheit. By 
preserving the dialectical usage of this concept, it illuminates Adorno’s gesturing towards 
a non-identical totality in and through individuals. Adorno is also influenced by the 
Hegelian-Marxist idea of Gattungswesen in putting the potential for radical transformation 
into the hands of humanity itself. It would be a reconciliation between the individual and 
the species.  
The global subject I argue is the missing link in a real understanding of Adorno’s 
complicated relationship with the topic of political praxis and revolution. Adorno was 
unrelenting in his insistence on the emancipation and liberation of all human beings from 
the false totality of monopoly capitalism, and this is admirable. Adorno probably could 
never truly back the revolutionary movement in his day. He knew it would fail because 
they had not worked this out, and we still have not. Only when theory can locate more 
precisely what a true negative totality is, can real change, and not its semblance take place. 
This requires a population that is mature in the Kantian sense, and therefore requires a 
fundamental reorientation of the education system for the 21st century, and a new way of 
collectively organizing in effective ways for our own survival. But this task is not entirely 
reducible to theory, the question is how might we “steer between the alternatives of 
spontaneity and organization”.168 
 
166 Adorno, “On Subject and Object,” 247.  
167 Ibid.  
168 Adorno, “Marginalia to Theory and Praxis,” 274.  
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This reading of Adorno, and what his work on the concept of the global subject 
could mean for our contemporary world is articulated from within the Anthropocene. While 
critique and theory must be embedded in one’s own time, this is where I speak from. 
Climate change brings with it a very real concrete standpoint and impetus for connecting 
the individual with the species to establish a ground for solidarity on which to 
democratically revolutionize the entirety of human life to truly objective ends. Climate 
change is the necessary basis on which to establish first, an interest in revolution, and 
second, a universal interest on which we can unite a global “consciousness” for revolution. 
Climate change has the potential to bring together the objective and subjective sides of the 
revolutionary subject.   
Climate change is the largest and most fundamental concern of our time. The earth 
is warming at alarming rates, flora and fauna are dying, the water cycles of the planet are 
changing, and the desertification of landscapes is growing faster than expected, all because 
of the unregulated pursuit of profit by individuals and corporations. The ecosystems we are 
a part of are becoming more volatile and unpredictable, resulting in drought’s, sever 
weather events, which pose serious threats to many people’s lives. The world’s leading 
climate scientists now warn that if global temperatures rise 1.5C above pre-industrial 
levels, then efforts to mitigate the impact of climate change on human civilization will 
become increasingly futile. The UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
released a report in October 2018 arguing that even in the rare case that the global 
community reaches the Paris Climate Accord goal of keeping global temperatures “well 
below 2C from pre-industrial levels,”169 it would still be devastating for well-functioning 
 
169 United Nations, Paris Agreement, (2015). Article 2.1(a).  
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ecosystems and human adaptation to these changes will become increasingly difficult. It 
concluded that more radical change is needed.170  
It is not a stretch to articulate the fact that people are already predicting the end of 
human civilization as we know it. The National Center for Climate Restoration in Australia 
for example published a report arguing that climate change presents a “near – to mid-term 
existential threat to human civilization.”171 It is an alarming observation that today it is 
easier to conceive of the end of the world then the end of capitalism.172 But an end to 
civilization as we know it is not inevitable, if there is immediate and drastic action. An 
immediate and global effort is required to address humanity’s self-destructive system of 
production. Capitalism has littered the globe with billions of tons of plastic, destroyed 
environments for the sake of profit, and perpetuated a system relying on the burning of 
fossil fuels that is destroying us and all other life on earth. Capitalism, and the domination 
that it is built on, must be left behind if we are to avoid this immanent catastrophe. A global 
subject is needed to address a total global problem.  
A global subject is humanity having control of its own survival under its own 
rational establishment. It may usher in a world where humanity is safe, when people have 
no reason to fear. An attractive feature of Adorno’s philosophy is his discussion of progress 
as containing an affinity between human beings and the natural world. The more we try 
and dominate nature the more we dominate each other and vice versa. We must halt this 
tendency because it will lead to our extinction, and it is equally evil because of the suffering 
it causes among our species.  
 
170 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “Understanding Global Warming of 1.5C,” (2018).  
171 David Spratt and Ian Dunlop, Existential Climate-Related Security Risk: A Scenario Approach, (May 
2019), 4.  
172 This quote is attributed to Fredric Jameson.  
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We can do better. We must do better or prepare for the worst. We need to step out 
of the spell that is cast over our world, the spell that is causing suffering, the spell that is 
causing civil unrest, and racism, hate, anxiety, and much more. Humanity has sunk into a 
new kind of barbarism, in an age of utopian possibilities. The climate catastrophe we now 
face as a species from within the Anthropocene necessitates a revolution. We have very 
little time left before the extinction of our species starts rapidly approaching. The only way 
to effectively avoid catastrophe is to take the concept of the global subject from Adorno’s 
work and understand what is so meaningful about this concept in conceiving a way 
forward. A non-dominating relation to ourselves, our own species, and the natural world is 
the only way we can survive. Thus, we need a revolution for radical democracy, and a 
radical distribution and decentralization of resources to curb our individual and collective 
impact on the biosphere around us, to be the harbinger of the social revolution that will 
launch the human species into a new era of its evolution. 
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